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SOCIAL COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE PRIMING 
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by 
JUN YI GINNY CHAN 
Advisor: Professor Philip T. Yanos 
In high-profile violent incidents, there appears to be a disproportionate focus on the 
perpetrator’s mental health status in relation to the incident (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996; 
Gallup Inc., 2011, 2013).  Several studies have highlighted the biased nature of the media in 
reporting news on mental illness and its negative impact on general consensus (Corrigan et al., 
2013; McGinty e al., 2013; Wahl, 1992, 2003; Wahl & Lefkowits, 1989).  Researchers have also 
suggested that the media is a significant source of knowledge for the public (Jorm, 2000; Wahl, 
2003).  While existing social psychological explanations have contributed to understanding this 
phenomenon, there remain questions about the mechanism of the process.  Based on a 
constructive model of communication, pragmatic inference posits that one does not remember 
information verbatim and may remember details that were not explicitly stated but plausibly 
implied (Brewer, 1977).  From a social cognitive perspective, pragmatic inference and stereotype 
priming provide a framework to understand the reader’s comprehension as it captures the reality 
of information processing in real-time.  The current studies thus aimed to examine the underlying 
processes in reading comprehension, the impact of stereotypical beliefs regarding mental illness, 
and the potential impact of mood.  The interaction of mood and cognition has generally found 
support for greater reliance on stereotypes in positive relative to negative mood (Bodenhausen et 
al.,1994a; Park & Banaji, 2000). Results from both studies generally supported the main effect of 





of news in the media.  That is, lay people appear to remember gist of information, rather than 
accurate presented information, and this remembered material was also impacted by stereotypes 
that were activated by a priming stimulus (mention of mental illness).  Additionally, results 
yielded large effect sizes across the main dependent memory measures.  However, self-report 
attitudinal measures and information-processing styles were not significantly related to memory 
measures.  Overall, the results suggest the significance of mentioning mental illness by the media 
and its repercussions in terms of propagating exaggerated stereotypes of mental illness among 
laypersons consuming the news.  Thus, responsible and more prudent reporting is recommended 
in terms of the inclusion of only pertinent information in news articles on violent incidents.  
Additionally, results illuminate the social cognitive processes that underlie one’s reading and 
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Chapter 1: Overview of Media Representation of Mental Illness 
 Shortly after two widely covered mass shootings in the United States (the 2011 Tucson 
and 2013 Washington Naval Yard gun shooting, both involving multiple victims), Gallup Inc. 
(2011, 2013) polled opinion surveys on what the general public believed to be preventable 
causes of mass shootings. When asked about the main 'factors that are to be blamed' (Gallup Inc., 
2011) for the 2011 shooting, 48% of the respondents attributed a great deal of blame to the 
inadequacy of the mental health system in 'identifying individuals who are a danger to others,' 
46% agreed that gun control access played a role, and 42% accorded to the role drug use had. In 
2013, the same questions found a similar rate of endorsement of the mental health system failure 
(48%), a slight decrease in both gun control access (40%), and drug use (37%). Thirty-two 
percent of respondents also agreed that the mental health system failure contributed a fair amount 
to mass shootings and comparatively, gun control access was endorsed by 21% of the 
respondents.  
Results from this survey clearly highlighted that the large majority of the polled 
consensus (80%) had agreed that the mental health system's lack of identification of “dangerous 
individuals” was an important factor leading to mass shootings relative to 61% who agreed that 
access to gun was an important factor (Gallup Inc., 2013).  As the survey was administered two 
days after the incidents, the results may be biased towards a more reactive picture of public 
attitudes.  Nonetheless, the results provide a snapshot of public reactions to recent shootings both 
of which had incurred widespread media coverage. The polls also emphasized the attention that 
was placed on the mental health status of the perpetrator by the media and suggested that mental 
health issues were a significant concern and reported to be a causal factor of the ensuing violence 




 A study by Angermeyer and Matschinger (1996) in Germany had similar findings.  In 
1991, there were two assassination attempts, about eight months apart, on well-known German 
politicians by two individuals who both had a history of schizophrenia. Both incidents reportedly 
led to extensive coverage in the media where there was a disproportionate focus on their mental 
health history. The authors collected reported attitudes towards mental illness at six time points: 
right before the first assassination attempt, two weeks after the first attempt, a month after the 
second attempt, and three more times over the next two years. They found evidence of an 
increased desire for social distance (i.e., reported less desire to have someone with mental illness 
as a neighbor, co-worker, tenant, and a partner your child marries etc.) following the incidents 
with a gradual decrement over the two years.  However, reported desire for social distance 
remained significantly higher than before the first incident occurred (Angermeyer & 
Matschinger, 1996).  The authors argued that the results were indicative of the negative impact 
“selective reporting” in the media has on public attitudes and beliefs.  A thought-provoking 
result was also highlighted by the authors where they found that, 18 months after the second 
attack, 83.2% of respondents who remembered the incident also remembered that the perpetrator 
was a woman with mental illness and 48.7% recalled the involvement of mental illness in the 
second perpetrator for the second incident (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996).  
 The above two illustrations of media reporting about violent incidents involving people 
with mental illness are but a flavor of the general literature on the impact of media on attitudes 
toward mental illness.  Jorm and his colleagues (1997) coined the term mental health literacy to 
refer to the general notion and understanding of mental illness that can be geared toward 
recognizing and managing mental illness.  In a review on mental health literacy in Australia, they 




public was receiving their information on mental illness and suggested some possible sources: 
personal experiences, friends' and family's experiences, news reports, television, and films (Jorm, 
2000).  He cited a survey in the United Kingdom where 32% of respondents indicated media as 
their primary source of information (Wolff, Pathare, Craig, & Leff, 1996; as cited in Jorm, 2000) 
and also described several studies supporting the influence of media over public attitudes.  
Additionally, Jorm (2000) noted the disproportionately high frequency of violence and crime 
associated with mental illness that was present in the media. 
 Given the ubiquity of the media in many societies and its importance as an “official” 
source of information to the public (e.g., Jorm, 2000; Wahl, 1992, 2003), this negative bias of 
information likely has a role in shaping public opinions and beliefs about mental illness (e.g., 
Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996; Wahl, 1992).  To better understand how the current view of 
mental illness in the general public came to be, reviewing research on media and mental illness is 
an informative and essential step.  Consequently, it is also important to consider the various 
processes that may underlie this transmission of information. That is, to explore the social and 
cognitive processes by which the public come to endorse these stereotypical beliefs.  
 This literature review will thus include the following topics of interest: mental health 
stigma, stereotypes and their activation (social aspect), factors impacting stereotype activation, 
media and its portrayal of mental illness, the impact of media on attitudes towards mental illness, 
and pragmatic inference (cognitive aspect).  The review of mental health stigma highlights the 
common stereotypes that are associated with mental illness and discusses the general public 
attitudes towards mental illness.  A discussion of the literature on the nature of stereotypes and 
its activation will follow and it aims to improve the understanding of how stereotypes are 




illness stereotypes should largely function in a similar fashion to other classic areas of 
stereotypes that have been studied (e.g., race, gender, age) as it is based on the same underlying 
theories and processes. Understanding the mechanisms of stereotype activation is imperative 
when our goal is to examine how people endorse these stereotypes and how they are perpetuated.  
Subsequently, past research exploring how media portrays mental illness would be surveyed.  
Besides the descriptive analysis of media content and portrayal, social psychological approaches 
to understanding stigma perpetuated by the media would also be considered.  Pragmatic 
inference, a cognitive mechanism in discourse processing, will then be reviewed and adopted 
along with stereotype activation as a social cognitive framework to better understand 

















Chapter 2: Mental Health Stigma 
 Link and Phelan (2001) described stigma as occurring when “elements of labelling, 
stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination occur together in a power situation” (p. 
377).  Using this conceptualization, stereotypes can be understood as one of the core components 
of stigma, and are usually construed as the cognitive component of the stigmatizing process 
(Biernat & Dovidio, 2003; Link & Phelan, 2001; Stier & Hinshaw, 2007).  Biernat and Dovidio 
(2003) proposed a similar understanding of stigma and further discussed how stereotypes can 
contribute to stigmatization.  They noted that the activation of stereotypes can spark a chain 
reaction of attributions that ultimately lead to social avoidance and discriminatory behavior.  For 
the current discussion, both stigma and stereotype will be considered in a similar manner.  That 
is, stigma refers to the overall experience stigmatized persons may face while stereotypes refer to 
the specific attributes linked to the label.  
 Since Goffman's (1963) influential discussion of the construct of stigma, research on 
stigma has been expanded into the various forms of identity or visible physical characteristics, 
e.g., race (Devine & Elliot, 1995), gender (Lupetow, Garovich, & Lupetow, 1995),  sexual 
orientation (Herek, 2000), HIV status (Parker & Aggleton, 2003), and individuals who are 
overweight (Crandall, 1994).  A major area of focus in the study of stigma and stereotyping has 
also been on the stigma towards persons diagnosed with mental illness. Research in this area has 
argued for the significant detrimental effects of mental health stigma in terms of more negative 
social integration, employment, and beliefs towards the self (Link, Cullen, Struening, Shrout, & 
Dohrenwend, 1989), well-being over a course of a year even after successful treatment 
completion (Link, Struening, Rahav, Phelan, & Nuttbrock, 1997), and impact on treatment 




at just mental illness, a recent comprehensive review highlighted and discussed the importance of 
considering the potential interactional effects of mental illness, race, and criminal history stigma 
(West, Yanos, & Mulay, 2014).  
 Although public awareness about mental illness appears to have grown, surveys of the 
US population suggest that public attitudes towards people with mental illness have not 
substantially changed since such attitudes were first tracked in the 1950s.  In a 1996 United 
States nationwide survey looking at public conceptualizations of mental illness, the authors 
found that mental illness symptoms as presented in a vignette elevated the public's beliefs about 
perceived dangerousness of and an increased desire of social distance from persons with mental 
illnesses (Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999).  The MacArthur Mental 
Health Study (as part of the General Social Survey) presented vignettes that painted a 
symptomatic picture of the following disorders: schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, 
alcohol dependence, cocaine dependence, and a “troubled” person with no formal mental 
disorder symptoms.  There were a significantly greater number of people who endorsed higher 
likelihood of dangerousness from the vignettes of the mental disorders as compared to the 
vignette of the “troubled” person.  With regards to an elevated desire for social distance, the 
authors argued that perceived dangerousness and the negative connotation of mental illness 
symptoms were the two main driving forces behind it.  Additionally, the authors compared the 
results of the survey to a study conducted in 1950 (Star, 1955, as cited in Link et al., 1999) and 
indicated that the notion of dangerousness among persons with mental illness had increased in 
the nearly fifty year period.  One other interesting result was that people had a greater tendency 
to classify the schizophrenia vignette as a mental illness and more likely to be dangerous when 




 An updated analysis compared the 1996 MacArthur Mental Health Study (as discussed 
above) with its 2006 replication counterpart and found no evidence for a decrease in the level of 
stigma against persons with mental illnesses 10 years later (Pescosolido et al., 2010).  This trend 
occurred in spite of the apparent increased knowledge of the public regarding the neurobiological 
underpinnings of mental illnesses.  In fact, the authors highlighted the disappointing finding that 
increased knowledge did not lead to a reduction in stigma.  Hinshaw and Stier (2008) have 
suggested that the medical model of explaining mental illness may be too reductionistic in its 
conceptualization, leading the general public to ignore other important factors such as the 
person-environment interaction.  Of particular concern here too, the vignette on schizophrenia 
was endorsed as being more likely to be dangerous to both self and others (Pescosolido et al., 
2010).  
 A recent review summarizing the state of research in the United States on the public's 
stigma towards mental illness found the following variables to be related to stigmatizing attitudes 
and beliefs: socio-demographic attributes of the respondent (e.g. age, gender, education, religion, 
political orientation, health status, and population density), personal contact with persons with 
mental illness, and causal attributions of mental illness (Parcesepe & Cabassa, 2013).  Of 
relevance here, the authors found that heightened ideas of dangerousness to self and others, 
relative to the general public and a 'normal' troubled person were common across the studies.  
Other stigmatizing beliefs include incompetence, higher rates of criminality, and generally more 
blame and punishment towards individuals with mental illness (Parcesepe & Cabassa, 2013).  As 
noted earlier, one intriguing association noted in these population-based surveys was that causal 
attributions of the mental illness to biological bases (i.e., genetics or chemical imbalance) was 




Cabassa, 2013; Pescosolido et al., 2010).  Education about mental illness was one of the earlier 
proposed methods to reducing stigmatizing beliefs (Corrigan, Markowitz, & Watson, 2004) and 
it may seem counter-intuitive that this relationship was found. Perhaps the lay public's 
understanding of neurobiological explanations of mental illnesses is more perfunctory than 
accurately nuanced, and may lead them to assume and infer that psychiatric symptoms are not 
able to be controlled and thus, contribute to a sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability of 
the individual with mental illness.  
 Cross-culturally, Angermeyer and Dietrich (2006) found a similar pattern of beliefs and 
attitudes across 62 studies in various countries located in Europe, North America, Hong Kong, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  Of interest here is the finding that the most common belief lay 
people have of persons with mental illness is that they are unpredictable.  The conception of 
persons with mental illness as being dangerous was also typically endorsed, although to a lesser 
degree.  As in the previous study by Link and his colleagues (1999), schizophrenia was usually 
seen as unpredictable and dangerous (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006).  This review article points 
to the enduring nature of stereotypes of persons with mental illness among the public and also 
highlights an important point of the lay opinions about what constitutes a mental illness.  That is, 
lay people routinely sees psychotic symptoms or behavior such as talking to self and hearing 
voices as being indicative of mental disorders.  This also implies that overt, behavioral symptoms 
are a cue to most public as a sign of mental illness and is important because in stereotype 
research, these overt cues may well be the trigger of automatic processing of stereotypes. 
Implicit attitudes toward mental illness   
Besides surveys on attitudes and beliefs regarding mental illness, Stier and Hinshaw 




beyond the usual explicit self-reported measures due to the potential negating factors of social 
desirability.  They argued that implicit bias predicts other forms of discrimination and are, often, 
different from explicit measures' predictions.  Therefore, there is added value in examining 
implicit biases (Stier & Hinshaw, 2007).  The authors recommended the use of the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and the Go/No Go Task (GNAT; Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001) in future studies looking at implicit bias in mental illness stigma.  The IAT is a 
widely-used and studied paradigm that was designed to assess implicit attitudes purported to be 
outside of one's conscious control (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  A meta-analysis on the IAT has 
generally indicated significant predictive validity of behavior, judgment and physiological 
measures and also demonstrated incremental validity over self-report measures especially in 
topics that are vulnerable to societal norms and impression management (Greenwald, Poehlman, 
Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009).  The GNAT is based on the same underlying principles as the IAT 
but instead of having two contrasting categories, respondents are asked to response to positive 
associations and to inhibit actions otherwise (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). 
 In one of the first studies examining implicit biases in mental health stigma,  Teachman, 
Wilson, and Komarovskaya (2006) found strong evidence for implicit bias towards persons with 
mental illness (e.g., helplessness and blameworthiness).  This result was significant even when 
there was no corresponding report of explicit bias, thereby underscoring the importance of 
implicit measures.  One other sobering pattern of findings was that there was no in-group bias for 
people with mental illness — they endorsed equally significant levels of implicit bias (Teachman 
et al., 2006).  Another informative study on implicit measures of stigma towards mental illness 
examined the potential moderating variable of culture.  The authors found that implicit measures 




measures differentiated stigma between physical and mental illness (Cheon & Chiao, 2012).  
Taken together, the preliminary findings from implicit measures of mental health stigma seem to 
parallel results from more explicit measures (for a thorough conceptual review of implicit 
measures in social cognition, see Fazio & Olsen, 2003).  
 Monteith and Pettit (2011) compared differences between explicit and implicit measures 
of stigma towards persons with depression using an experimental approach.  By manipulating the 
diagnosis (depression vs. physical illness) in a vignette, the online study examined the 
differences in attitudes and beliefs in the participants.  Explicit attitudes were measured by a self-
report questionnaire while implicit attitudes were assessed by the use of the Implicit Association 
Task.  The authors compared the measures and found significant differences. Specifically, when 
compared to physical illness, implicit measures indicated more negative attitudes towards 
depression and lower temporal stability of depression while there were no such results for the 
explicit measures (Monteith & Pettit, 2011).  This study represents a preliminary step towards 
laboratory studies looking at mental illness stereotype activation and highlights the importance of 
looking at implicit measures beyond a self-report or interview. 
 From the above surveys examining both explicit and implicit attitudes towards persons 
with mental illness, it is evident that the most common attitudes and beliefs about persons with 
mental illness are negative.  The idea of dangerousness and unpredictability also appears to be a 
common theme in large surveys of attitudinal measures.  Correspondingly, it follows that 
dangerousness, uncontrollability, and unpredictability are some common stereotypes that are 






Chapter 3: Prevalence of Violence in Persons with Mental Illness 
A related issue when one considers mental health stigma is the controversy over the 
actual base rate of violence amongst persons with mental illness (Borum, 1996; Link, Andrews, 
& Cullen, 1992; Monahan, 1992).  One oft-mentioned argument revolves around whether the 
stereotypes of violence and aggression are “inaccurate stereotypes or reflections of important 
realities” (p. 275, Link et al., 1992).  
 In his 1991 APA Award Address, Monahan (1992) discussed the contentious issue of the 
relationship between mental disorder and violent behaviors.  His main arguments were that 
mental illness and violence did indeed have a modest relationship, but that the extent, and 
synergistic impact, of other important factors (e.g., age, socioeconomic status, neighborhood) on 
this relationship were not yet well studied (also noted by Link et al., 1992).  Monahan (1992) 
went on to suggest better ways of teasing apart the differential impact these hypothesized 
variables may have by: i) comparing the rate of violence among persons with mental illness and 
a comparable community sample; and ii) comparing the incidence of mental illness among 
offenders and a comparable community sample.  Lastly, he also emphasized that in spite of any 
modest statistical relationship found, most persons with mental illness are not, and have never 
been, violent (Monahan, 1992).  
 As Monahan (1992) and other researchers have highlighted (Morenoff, Sampson, & 
Radudenbush, 2001), neighborhood factors play an integral role when one considers the base rate 
of violence.  In an informative study to control for this variable, Steadman and colleagues (1998) 
compared rates of violent behaviors among residents, with and without mental illness, in the 
same neighborhood.  For this study, adults with mental illness were interviewed every 10 weeks 




and official sources which were collateral information obtained from the police and hospitals 
records.  The authors found no differences in rates of violence between patients without a co-
occurring substance relative to a comparison group also without substance abuse.  What was 
striking, however, was the incremental risk of violence when substance abuse was considered.  
There were also a greater proportion of patients, relative to their counterparts with no mental 
illness, who reported abuse of substances.  A related compelling finding highlighted that, across 
the violent behaviors reported by persons with mental illness, the large fraction was towards 
family members and friends/acquaintances (86.2%) and in homes or other residences (69%). 
This is in direct contrast to fears of being a stranger victim of someone with mental illness.  In 
fact, a noteworthy difference in this study was that the community sample was significantly more 
likely to exhibit aggression in public areas (e.g., bars) as compared to the mental illness sample 
(Steadman et al., 1998).  
Corroborating evidence of the relative weight of substance abuse as a predictor of 
violence was obtained in another study (Elbogen & Johnson, 2009).   The authors analyzed data 
from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, a large nationally 
representative survey on variables related to mental illness, violence, and other related factors.  
Results indicated that the most robust and reliable risk factors for violence were a combination of 
several variables, and not a single factor was a reliable predictor.  Notably, mental illness as a 
diagnosis per se, did not predict violence.  Some variables highlighted in the study included 
historical risk factors that have been associated with violence (e.g., presence of past violence, 
juvenile detention, physical abuse), reported substance abuse/dependence alongside mental 
illness diagnosis, perceived threats, younger age, being male, low income, and recent events such 




Recent nationwide epidemiological studies and more focused longitudinal studies have 
both supported a relationship between mental illness and violence only when other important 
factors are taken into consideration (i.e., concurrent substance abuse, younger age, and low 
income) (Elbogen & Johnson, 2009; Robbins, Monahan, & Silver, 2003).  The overwhelming 
evidence reveals that it is not just having a mental illness, or certain symptoms (e.g., delusions, 
see Appelbaum, Robbins, & Monahan, 2000), that leads to aggressive behavior.  Rather, it is the 
combination of circumstances and individual characteristics, for example, having a past violent 
incident, being in a less privileged environment, substance abuse, and noncompliance with 
medication among other factors that precipitates violent behavior.  Therefore, the use of a mental 
illness diagnosis, in and of itself, as a sole and strong predictor of violent behavior is misleading, 
inaccurate, and unhelpfully stigmatizing (Elbogen & Johnson, 2009; Fuller, 1994; Steadman et 
al., 1998).  Along this same line, it is erroneous to solely use the presence of a mental disorder as 
a unique, retrospective attempt at explaining any violent incident.  As perhaps best articulated by 
Monahan (1992), “none of the data give any support to the sensationalized caricature of the 
mentally disordered served up by the media” (p. 519).   
Indeed, one hallmark of a stereotype is the ease in which one may be inclined to rely on it 
as a default in social judgments (e.g., Bargh, 1994, 1999; Dunning & Sherman, 1997).  In the 
case of mental illness, as discussed earlier, the overwhelming negative stereotypic traits 
associated suggest that consequently, the general public may unfortunately view someone with 
mental illness through that lens.  Most studies have also cautioned against categorizing mental 
illness as a homogenous group (Fuller, 1994; Monahan, 1992; Steadman et al., 1998) which 
further highlights a potential problem that may be exacerbated by the media if they have a 




understand the mechanisms by which stereotypes come to be and are maintained and related 
information processing biases that may be undertaken by the general lay person when they come 
























Chapter 4: Mechanisms in Stereotype Activation 
 Given the prevalence of negative stereotypes about mental illness, it is important to 
consider how stereotypes form and what factors lead to their activation.  There has been a wealth 
of discussion surrounding stereotypes, their proposed mechanisms, and their implications for the 
field of social cognition.  Stereotypes are generally conceptualized as a derivative of social 
categorization (Park & Rothbart, 1982; Fiske & Taylor, 2013) and are “beliefs or associations 
that link whole groups of people with certain traits or characteristics” (p. 148, Kassin, Fein, & 
Markus, 2011). Stereotypes have been found to have an implicit influence in human social life 
that may be out of one’s conscious volition (Dunning & Sherman, 1997).   An important concept 
in relation to stereotypes is the presence of in-groups and out-groups; the former refers to a group 
one affiliates with and the latter refers to people who are deemed to not belong to one's identified 
group (Kassin et al., 2011).  This concept of in-groups versus out-groups has implications for 
how people categorize other social beings and the resultant biases that may occur as a 
consequence.  Some examples of stereotypic concepts that have been studied in the laboratory  
have included increased hostility observed after priming participants with Black faces (Bargh, 
Chen, & Burrows, 1996), worse performance at math after being primed with being a female 
(Steele, 1997), and slower walking speed when the stereotype of old age was activated (Bargh et 
al., 1996).  In these (and other similar) experiments, the notion of the stereotype is typically 
primed (often subliminally or via an ostensibly unrelated task) in the participants and then 
measured on a subsequent task.  
 Dual process models in cognitive processes have been a popular conceptualization of the 
brain’s mechanisms and have been used on various topics such as information processing in 




decision-making (Kahneman, 2003, 2011).  In her widely cited paper on the theory describing 
how stereotypes work, Devine (1989) proposed a dual-process model consisting of stereotype 
activation and stereotype application.  She argued that the former was an automated process that 
occurs largely beyond the control of conscious efforts while the latter process was a controlled 
process in which inhibition of the stereotype could occur.  Other researchers since have been 
either on the side of the pervasiveness of automaticity (e.g., Bargh, 1994, 1999; Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995) or on the side of a more moderated process of the automaticity of stereotype 
activation such that activation only occurs under specific conditions (e.g. Blair, 2002; Casper, 
Rothermund, & Wentura, 2010; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001a, 2001b).  Blair (2002) 
contended that the automaticity of stereotypes is not as inevitable and rigid as research has 
suggested (Bargh, 1994, 1999; Devine, 1989). 
 Researchers arguing for the automaticity of stereotypes highlighted the robust finding of 
stereotype activation across several tasks and that the activation usually occurs outside of, and 
sometimes, in spite of, one’s conscious awareness (see Bargh, 1999; Bargh & Chatrand, 1999; 
Uleman, Saraji, & Gonzalez, 2008 for an in-depth discussion and review).  This phenomenon 
runs parallel to research on subliminal priming (an oft-used method in stereotype research) 
where people have been found to have a lack of awareness about their mental processes.  
Subliminal priming refers to the presentation of a priming stimulus that is outside of one's 
reported conscious awareness (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2004).  In their seminal article, Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977) argued that introspection is limited: people are generally not aware of their 
thought processes when the stimuli are not obvious or plausible, and when asked to explain their 
behavior, they tend to rely on a priori hypotheses and assumptions.  Given this argument, it is 




pathway.  In the same vein, automatic processing of stereotypes may also operate non-
consciously. 
 In more contemporary research testing specifically the implications of subliminal priming 
on overt stereotypical behaviors, Bargh and his colleagues (1996) subliminally primed 
participants with the stereotype of African American in their third experiment.  Participants 
subliminally primed with the young African American male face exhibited more hostile 
behaviors towards the experimenter following an ostensible technical failure during the 
experiment.  The authors concluded that their finding replicated Devine’s (1989) study on the 
automated effect of racial stereotypes.  Working on a similar line of study, Dijksterhuis and 
colleagues (2000) subliminally primed participants with elderly stereotypes, not related 
specifically to forgetfulness, and gave them a surprise recall test thereafter.  The results showed 
that the degree to which participants associated ‘elderly’ to ‘forgetfulness’ predicted worse 
performance on the recall task.  Generally, studies in this area have lent support to the 













Chapter 5: Factors Affecting Stereotype Activation 
Since the initial conceptions of the automaticity of stereotype activation, there has been 
subsequent research challenging the automated nature of stereotypes.  Studies have thus 
investigated the different factors that may impact the precipitation of stereotypes.  Given the 
complex nature in the make-up of society in the United States, it is reasonable to consider the 
influence of competing social categories and the ensuing interaction of all categories (e.g., age, 
gender, and race) and other variables that may impact on stereotype activation such as goals and 
mood in social judgments.  
Social categories 
Gardner, Macintyre, and Lalonde (1995) looked at the results of juggling several social 
categories (i.e., ethnicity – French and English Canadian, age, and gender) and how that impacts 
judgments and remembering.  The study required participants to first make judgments about 
groups (i.e., males, females, 20-year-old, 70-year-old) on dichotomous traits such as quiet-
talkative, unemotional-emotional, rugged-delicate, and modern-traditional.  Their response and 
latencies were recorded for these judgments and generally, stereotypic traits were found to be 
judged more rapidly than non-stereotypic traits (i.e., faster judgments of 'rugged' for males and 
'delicate' for females).  The next phase of the study included presenting eight stimulus target 
individuals described in terms of the three reference groups (e.g., Person 1 is a 70-year-old 
French Canadian male and Person 2 is a female 20-year-old English Canadian, in a 
counterbalanced order) and were asked to rate these individuals on separate attributes.  The final 
part of the study involved remembering what the gender, age, or ethnicity of the target individual 
was in which accuracy and speed were measured.  Results obtained indicated that people 




response latency between 70-year-old females and 20-year-old males; and French Canadians 
took a longer time than English Canadians).  Participants were also significantly faster in 
remembering age and gender, relative to ethnicity in this study, and the authors explained that it 
may be due to more infrequent usage of French versus English Canadian ethnicity compared to 
age and gender.  They noted that in group judgments, stereotypic trait effects were observed such 
that female group targets were judged to be more typical of the single female trait, relative to 
males.  That is, 70-year-old female was judged to be more delicate compared to a 20-year-old 
male.  The authors also concluded that respondents were fastest in judging the category of age as 
participants were all young college students; age in this case was the most different between the 
perceiver and target person.  An interesting point noted was that “the most salient feature is the 
one that provides the greatest discrimination from other persons in the social context, making it 
the most informative dimension” (p. 480, Stangor et al., 1992, as cited in Gardner et al., 1995).   
This suggests that the most distinctive (whether visually, auditorily, or olfactorily) feature may 
be the one variable that captures a lay person's attention and activates any associated stereotypes.  
When considering the more externalizing and odd behaviors someone may associate with mental 
illness, it is reasonable to assume that those features may be the salient ones that are calling for 
attention. 
Goals 
Another example examining the impact of different variables is a study conducted by 
Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal (1999) who evaluated the effects of possessing 
egalitarian goals on gender stereotype activation.  They compared differences between the 
participants who have chronic goals of gender equality and those without.  The results they 




same type of stereotypic activation.  The authors argued that it is evidence that the implicit 
activation of a long-held goal extends its effort to inhibit stereotypic activation (Moskowitz et al., 
1999).  It may be that this is one individual difference that differentiates a prejudiced individual 
from someone who is less prejudiced. 
Types of judgments 
 Wittenbrink and colleagues (2001a) investigated the extent to which the nature of the 
judgments (conceptual versus evaluative) would affect whether racial stereotypes are activated 
and subsequently affect responses.  The authors measured conceptual judgments using a lexical 
decision task (word or non-word) and evaluative judgments by asking participants to choose 
between positive or negative (good or bad).  The results supported their hypotheses that the types 
of judgments resulted in different automatic responses: The conceptual judgment condition 
induced facilitation to valenced items that are indicative of the primed group while the evaluative 
judgment condition led to a broader facilitation of all negative valence for the out-group and 
positive valence for the in-group (Wittenbrink et al., 2001a).  The authors concluded by 
highlighting the different nature of the automaticity and the different ways it may be manifested 
depending on the type of judgments asked.  
Context   
On a similar note looking at factors that impact stereotype activation, Wittenbrink et al. 
(2001b) manipulated the contexts in which racial primes occurred and found evidence supporting 
a specific activation of context-dependent stereotypes.  That is, a negative evaluation of Blacks 
was only activated when paired with a street-corner context (as induced by a picture) compared 
to when participants were shown a picture of a church.  Casper et al. (2010) replicated 




Bavarians, Asians, and Arabs) and found support for an interaction between context and 
categories.  The authors concluded that automatic stereotypical activation does not occur 
inevitably, but is dependent on the context in which it appears in.  However, as the authors 
appear to be using the same person variable stereotypes, it may be that the stereotype is still 
being primed.  The stronger primed effect then occurred when context is added into the equation. 
Cognitive style   
Besides the importance of goals, another variable that has been examined in individual 
differences in the automaticity of stereotypic activation is the need for cognition (Florack, 
Scarabis, & Bless, 2001).  The need for cognition refers to “a need to structure relevant situations 
in meaningful, integrated ways…a need to understand and make reasonable the experiential 
world” (p. 291; Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955).  Florack and colleagues (2001) cited prior 
research which suggested that people with lower need for cognition appeared to be more 
influenced by stereotypes.  Results from their study supported this trend and the authors 
proposed that this difference is due to more elaborate and deliberate processing of “corrective 
mechanisms” (p. 522) and consideration of other pertinent factors among people with a higher 
need for cognition.  This suggests that stereotype activation occurs at a more automatic level, but 
can be negotiated if one spent more time and effort in considering other potential influential 
variables or possess the resources to negate the stereotypes.  
 The need for closure is another cognitive processing style that has been examined in 
terms of individual differences and its potential implications in social judgments.  Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994) defined the need for closure construct generally as an individual’s inclination 
and preference to obtain answers, regardless of its accuracy, when faced with ambiguous 




prefers order and structure, expresses uneasiness with uncertainty, prefers having answers which 
manifest in rapid judgments and choices, possesses low openness to new experiences and 
situations, and would rather not seek out information that challenges held knowledge (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994).  Need for closure has been found to be related to conservative beliefs and 
racism (van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004), impact on negotiations in group interactions (De 
Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999), and affects in-group biases in beliefs and attitudes 
(Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). 
Mood 
Another area of study that has been implicated in the extent of stereotype activation is the 
role of affect (Bless, Schwarz, & Kemmelmeier, 1996).  Specifically, different moods have been 
experimentally induced and examined with regards to their influence on stereotype activation.  
Generally, findings from the literature indicates that positive affect (typically happy mood) has 
been associated with increased use of heuristics and taking a global perspective; whereas 
negative affect (usually sad mood) has been linked with more in-depth and detailed processing 
(Bodenhauser, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Park & Banaji, 2000).  Being in 
a sad mood has also been found to be associated with a higher likelihood of correcting negative 
stereotype endorsement, and impression formation, when the stereotypes were deemed 
inappropriate for the social judgment situation (Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997).  
There have been several theories proposed on the mechanism by which mood affects 
stereotype activation (Clore and Huntsinger, 2007; Forgas, 1995; Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  One 
widely-cited and discussed theory, affect-as-information, is neatly reviewed by Clore and 
Huntsinger (2007) who presented evidence in support of it.  Basically, this theory posits that 




processing.  That is, affect informs on the depth, value, and type of processing that one 
eventually choose to engage in (Clore & Huntdinger, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  Forgas 
(1995) conceptualized a comprehensive model where he included other variables such as the 
target person’s attributes (e.g., familiarity and typicality), one’s own characteristics (e.g., 
motivational goals and cognitive capacity), and situational constraints (e.g., focus on accuracy 
and social desirability).  
More recent research in this area has moved towards differentiating between types of 
emotions (e.g., anger and sadness), rather than viewing emotions as belonging to two categories, 
i.e., positive and negative valence.  This aspect of research has largely focused on judgment of 
causality in social contexts (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; ), judgment of risks and 
associated decision-making (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 
2000; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).  Generally, studies have found differences suggesting 
differential implications of anger and fear.  Specifically, anger has been associated with more 
optimistic estimates when asked about risks of death due to medical diseases and natural 
disasters.  The reverse pattern was found for participants induced in a fearful mood (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000).  Similar results were found when risk of terrorism attacks was measured using 
9/11-related news articles as stimuli (Lerner et al., 2003).  Lerner and colleagues (2000; 2003) 
explained that anger tends to make people feel more in control and certain about their world 
views and beliefs whereas fear increases one’s uncertainty and decreases feelings of being in 
control.  
Another direction in contemporary research on mood and stereotypes is on the 
generalizability of affect’s impact across situations to better inform on its mechanism of 




examined across situations to probe for possible variance in its impact.  Huntsinger and 
colleagues (2010) examined the effects of the type of accessible thoughts available and its 
influence on stereotype activation.  One way in which they manipulated accessibility was by 
priming with stereotypic and counter-stereotypic images (e.g., for the concept of female, 
exposing participants to a picture of a flower and strong female leader, respectively).  When 
primed with counter-stereotypic stimulus, participants induced in a positive mood were more 
prone to endorsing less stereotypic beliefs (measured by an implicit association task) than when 
in a negative mood.  The authors found similar results when egalitarian goals were primed in 
participants, leading them to conclude that the influence of positive affect on stereotyping is 
contingent on the available thoughts people hold at the time of judgment (Huntsinger et al., 
2010).  
News reports on social issues, such as crime, natural disasters, and health, can 
understandably elicit moods according to their depiction (Goodall, Slater, & Myers, 2013; Gross, 
2008; Nabi, 2003).  Given the impact mood has on subsequent stereotype activation, it is 
interesting to examine the types of emotional responses that are typically ascribed to news 
reports involving mental illness and violent incidents.  Unfortunately, this area has not yet been 
widely studied.  In one online experiment designed to examine the role of emotions in reaction to 
news reports of crime and accidents, the authors manipulated the inclusion of the variable of 
interest, alcohol as a causal factor of the incident (Goodall et al., 2013).  They found that overall, 
participants had a tendency to attribute blame to the individual rather than consider the 
extenuating circumstances also reported.  This relationship was also found to be attenuated by 
anger, relative to fear, that is, those who reported greater anger had a higher likelihood of 




show alcohol use as a causal factor, participants reported higher levels of anger and blame. They 
also endorsed greater support for policies advocating greater enforcement of alcohol control 
laws, which was not found in participants who reported more fear than anger (Goodall et al., 
2013).  Extrapolating from this finding to news report of mental illness and violence, similar 
results may be expected in cases of violent news, that more blame will be attributed to the 
individual with mental illness and there may be a greater call for more controlling public 
policies. 
 As discussed above, there are other factors that come into play when we consider the 
mechanism in which stereotypes are activated automatically.  In all these experiments though, 
stereotypes of the target group of people, whether positive or negative, still appeared to be 
activated and endorsed.  For example, in Wittenbrink et al. (2001b), a Black prime when paired 
with a positive context of a family barbecue demonstrated a significantly large decrease in 
prejudice than when shown a negative context of a gang-related incident.  Thus, the overall 
picture of stereotype activation seems to point to a contextual- (e.g., type and nature of 
judgment) and individual- (e.g., cognitive styles and mood) based automatic activation.  For an 
in-depth review the different underlying theories and contextual factors to the stereotyping 
process in general, refer to Hilton and von Hippel (1996).  This conceptualization of automatic 
stereotype activation has arguably more ecological validity in that most people do not function in 
a vacuum and will have context-dependent goals, information processing style, and varying 
knowledge of certain groups of people.  What ends up being precipitated then is the result of the 
configuration of one's own idiosyncrasies (e.g. need for cognition, Florack et al., 2001; mood, 
Huntsinger et al., 2010; Park & Banaji, 2000; Schwarz, 2001), the context (Wittenbrink et al., 




Racial stereotypes and dangerousness 
A related area of research in the United States, which is informative when considering 
perceptions and stereotypes of dangerousness, is on racial stereotypes and their impact on 
people’s perceptions of danger and violence.  Payne (2001) investigated the extent to which 
racial cues (Black versus White faces) had an effect on perceiving the existence of weapons in 
two separate experiments.  He found that, when primed with a Black face, participants were 
quicker and more likely to mistake a hand tool for a handgun.  In addition, Payne (2001) also 
attempted to tease out automatic and controlled processing and found evidence to support that 
the two processes are separate and function independently.  He concluded that there should 
theoretically be two conditions for the bias to occur: presence of stereotypic features and a lack 
of an opportunity to control one's responses. 
 Another study examining racial stereotypes and dangerousness took an interesting 
approach, and tested whether primed danger stereotypes in participants would affect their 
attention to Black versus White faces (Donders, Carroll, & Wittenbrink, 2008).  The authors 
obtained evidence that supported their hypotheses:  When primed with fear, participants 
appeared to allocate more attention to Black faces after controlling for prejudice and danger-
irrelevant stereotypes.  They then concluded that Black faces may be a “fear-conditioned 
stimulus” in line with learning and conditioning principles (Donders et al., 2008). 
 As outlined above, the overall literature on the nature of stereotypes generally support the 
account of an internalized social construct with its associated stereotypes which then gets 
automatically activated when the perceiver is in contact with a member of a group that the 
perceiver is able to discern.  The moderating factors that affect the response latency and 




(Moskowitz et al., 1999), context (Wittenbrink et al., 2001a), nature of judgments (Wittenbrink 

























Chapter 6: Media and Stereotypes 
 Following the discussion on the mechanisms underlying stereotype activation, it is 
informative to now consider a review of the valence and type of mental illness stereotypes that 
are propagated by the media.  The literature review began with a discussion on the attitudes 
towards mental illness which were found to be generally negative and hypothesized to be due to 
the negative stereotypes held by the lay public.  The role of media in shaping societal consensus 
has been noted by several researchers (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996; Jorm, 2000; Thornton 
& Wahl, 1996; Wahl, 1992) and particularly relevant here, attitudes towards crime and justice 
(Dowler, 2003).  It is thus essential to delve into for a better understanding of how these attitudes 
held came to be. 
An important area of consideration in the shaping and perpetuation of mental illness 
stereotypes in the United States is the role of media such as television, newspapers, radio, and 
more recently, the internet (Bornstein, 1992; Corrigan et al., 2005; Stuart, 2006; Wahl, 1992; 
Wahl, Woods, & Richards, 2002).  Studies investigating the depictions of mental illness have 
examined newspaper reports (Corrigan et al., 2005; Wahl et al., 2002) and television programs 
(Diefenbach, 1997; Granello & Pauley, 2000).  The overall conclusion reached by these authors 
is that the media influences the public’s agreement with negative stereotypes through its 
predominantly negative depictions of individuals with mental illness.  In fact, an early review on 
this topic concluded that: a) mental illness is frequently represented in the mass media and 
through various mediums (e.g., magazines, television, and films); b) presentations of mental 
illness are usually inaccurate with an emphasis on negative attributes (e.g., social and 
occupational failures, psychotic symptoms); c) these media portrayals are likely to have an 




portrayals of persons with mental illness have also been found to be associated with danger, 
committing violent crimes, being a negative burden on society, and having a poor quality of life 
(Corrigan et al., 2005; Diefenbach, 1997; Stuart, 2006; Wahl, 2003).   
 Outside of the United States, similar findings on the portrayals of persons with mental 
illness have been observed.  A review of studies on media content of mental illness and its 
influence on attitudes across several countries concluded, on a similar note, that media depictions 
are often exaggerated, inaccurate, and disproportionately focused on dangerousness (Klin & 
Lemish, 2008).  The authors also noted that the research at this stage lacks empirical, well-
controlled studies in terms of the mechanism of how public perceptions are influenced by media 
portrayals.  
 Corrigan and colleagues (2005) analyzed the content of newspaper articles on mental 
illness in 70 major US newspapers across 6 discrete periods over a year.  They found that the 
most common theme across the stories was dangerousness which accounted for 39 percent of all 
news articles collected.  Within the broader theme of danger, the two most common topics were 
on violent crimes and suicidal or self-injurious behaviors.  The authors noted that the proportion 
of dangerousness-themed articles seemed to be on the decline, but noted that it such articles still 
were in the majority and that violent crimes were, more often than not, featured prominently in 
the newspaper.  A positive finding was that there were more articles on treatment and recovery 
rather than blame (Corrigan et al., 2005).  
 Clement and Foster (2008) took a step further in considering the quality of reporting in 
mass media and compared newspaper reporting on schizophrenia in the United Kingdom 
between two time points – 1996 and 2005.  Some of the indicators of poor quality of reporting 




linguistically equating the person with schizophrenia, and presenting schizophrenia as the main, 
significant factor for risk of violence.  Overall findings suggested that quality of reporting did not 
improve in 2005 since 1996.  In particular, about one in seven articles included the use of a 
stigmatizing descriptor and there was evidence suggesting that schizophrenia was still seen as a 
precursor to unpredictable and violent behavior as only about 2% of articles on violence 
presented the risk of violence in an appropriate manner (Clement & Foster, 2008). 
 Besides newspaper reports on persons with mental illness, another source of media 
commonly studied is television viewing.  Angermeyer and colleagues (2005) compared watching 
television programs and reading news articles with the impact on reported attitudes towards 
persons with mental illness in a German population.  A positive correlation was found between 
amount of television viewed and increased desire for social distance from people with mental 
illness.  The finding for newspaper report was illuminating in that overall reading of newspapers 
had no effect on social distance.  Instead, it was the type of newspaper that participants reported 
reading that significantly correlated with social distance.  Specifically, respondents who reported 
regularly reading tabloids and regional newspapers also indicated higher preference for social 
distance as compared to participants who reported reading broadsheets or no newspapers 
(Angermeyer, Dietrich, Pott, & Matschinger, 2005).  
 In another interesting analysis looking at the type of television programs viewed and their 
relationship with attitudes toward mental illness, Granello and Pauley (2000) surveyed college 
students who reported television as their primary source of information on mental illness (about 
34% of the whole sample).  The same researchers have previously found that participants who 
reported media as the main source of information on mental health also adopted more punitive 




current study, they were interested in replicating the results and specifically examine the type of 
television content viewed.  Results indicated that hours reported watching television positively 
correlated with increasing intolerance towards persons with mental illness.  The authors further 
examined the type of programs reported and its relationship with specific attitudes.  Specifically, 
they found a positive correlation between watching soap operas and prime-time sitcoms and rigid 
and punitive attitudes towards persons with mental illness which they attributed to the higher 
frequency and more inaccurate portrayal of mental illness in these programs (e.g., Wahl & Roth, 
1982).  However, a negative correlation between consumption of news and viewing persons with 
mental illness as a threat was also found.  This finding did not seem in line with other research 
on negative news reports of mental illness.  One limitation of the study was the self-reported 
categories of television programs and the relatively young sample of participants (18 to 31 year 
olds) which may present only the viewing habits of one particular demographic group.  
Nevertheless, the findings supported the authors' contention about the significant influence 
media has in shaping public beliefs. 
There have been several experimental studies that examined the effects of media and 
reported attitudes towards mental illness.  In one of the first experimental designs testing the 
direct effects of media consumption, Wahl and Lefkowits (1989) showed college students a film 
depicting a killer with mental illness and examined their reported attitudes towards mental illness 
thereafter.  Compared to the control group, participants who viewed the film endorsed 
significantly more negative attitudes towards persons with mental illness.  Additionally, using a 
film trailer as a potential mitigating variable to warn participants that mental illness has no 
relationship with violence was found to be ineffective in influencing reported attitudes (Wahl & 




 In a replication of the above study with news articles, Thornton and Wahl (1996) tested 
the influence of a newspaper report on a violent crime and subsequent reported attitudes toward 
persons with mental illness.  For their study, they also included a condition where they added an 
article that explicitly corrects misconceptions about mental illness, in particular, the base rates of 
violence, to test for potential moderating effects of corrective information.  Results obtained 
supported their hypothesis that the newspaper article (adapted from an actual report) led to 
increased punitive attitudes and less acceptance toward persons with mental illness.  On a more 
optimistic note, corrective information led to a decrease in negative attitudes.  The corrective 
information used in the study included highlighting common misconceptions about mental 
illness, facts about the actual rare occurrence of violent incidents involving persons with mental 
illness, and the tendency of the media to portray mental illness in a misguided manner (Thornton 
& Wahl, 1996). 
To test the effects of providing more accurate information of mental illness in the media, 
Penn and colleagues (2003) compared reported attitudes and beliefs amongst participants who 
were exposed to either no documentary films, documentary films about unrelated topics, and 
documentary on schizophrenia.  Participants who were in the schizophrenia documentary 
condition reported less blame and personal responsibility towards persons with schizophrenia.  
Results for the overall attitude (i.e., perceived dangerousness and affective reactions) and social 
distance were less promising – although there appeared to be a trend in less negative attitudes, 
the means were not significantly different from the other groups.  The authors concluded that 
mere 'educational' strategies may not be effective in reducing stigma and recommended the 
inclusion of other strategies to reduce stigma (Penn, Chamberlin, & Mueser, 2003).  Another 




documentary film found similar results in terms of increasing the public's knowledge (Kimmerle 
& Cress, 2013).   
 More recent studies examining the effect of newspaper articles have found similar results.  
One study manipulated the valence of the media news article (positive, neutral, or negative) and 
examined the effect on people’s attitudes towards mental illness thereafter.  Results supported 
the contention that after reading negative articles on mental illness, participants reported more 
stigmatizing attitudes via a self-report measure (Corrigan, Powell, & Michaels, 2013).  Another 
empirical study investigated the effects of news articles depicting mental illnesses alongside gun 
control policies by randomly assigning online survey participants to four conditions (exposure to 
gun and mental illness only, and to both; and a no-exposure group).  The authors found evidence 
supporting that news portrayal of mass shooting events prompted more severe reported attitudes 
towards serious mental illness (McGinty, Webster, and Barry, 2013).  
  Experimental approaches to studying the relationship between media and mental illness 
stigma have largely focused on the influence of negative media depictions and resulting attitudes 
toward mental illness.  The overall results support a similar pattern of findings – that media 
portrayal of mental illness exerts an influence on reported attitudes, at least soon after the 
exposure.  Some studies have taken a step further and examined potential mitigating factors 
using corrective information in print (Thornton & Wahl, 1996) and in film (Wahl & Lefkowits, 
1989) and more accurate documentaries (Kimmerle & Cress, 2013; Penn et al., 2003) which has 







Chapter 7: Understanding Stigma in the Media 
Social psychology has a long and rich history of studying stereotypes and provides a most 
informative parallel to understanding the mechanisms underlying the stigma towards mental 
illness.  Applying psychological theories to mental illness stigma, the following three main areas 
have generally been proposed to explain why people stereotype: cognitive (e.g., categorization, 
illusory correlations, confirmation biases), motivational (e.g., social identity, just world 
hypothesis, terror management theory), affective approaches (e.g. classical conditioning, 
misattribution), and social cognitive factors (Corrigan, 2000; Corrigan & Cooper, 2005; 
Corrigan, Watson, & Ottati, 2003; Ottati, Bodenhausen, & Newman, 2005).  
 One affective approach that has been proposed is using the principle of classical 
conditioning in understanding how people adopt certain stereotypes of mental illness more easily 
than others.  Ottati and colleagues (2003) proposed that the general consensus of negative beliefs 
and attitudes and media portrayals of mental illness are two common sources (i.e., unconditioned 
stimulus) in which most of the public receive their information on mental illness.  In the former 
case, children are socialized into stigmatizing beliefs with the assumption that people generally 
tend to react in a negative way to persons with mental illness.  For the latter, given the propensity 
of media characters with mental illness to be depicted as dangerous, violent, and incompetent, 
the public then internalizes these associations through classical conditioning (Ottati et al., 2003).  
 The “just world” hypothesis (Lerner, 1980) is a motivational approach that seeks to 
explain the affective component of stereotype activation and endorsement (Ottati et al., 2003; 
Stangor & Crandall, 2003) and has also been theorized to operate on both explicit and implicit 
levels (Lerner, 1998).  The premise of the “just world” hypothesis is the assumption that good 




happens to an individual then, one who adheres to this belief is motivated to construct a reason in 
line with this principle.  With regards to mental illness, Ottati and colleagues (2003) suggested 
that if people generally believe that the onset of mental illness is within the individual's control, 
it will correspondingly increase stigma when something negative happens. Therefore, when 
persons with mental illness are portrayed as engaging in negative acts or being in an undesirable 
situation (e.g., being homeless), the view of that individual is that they just did not put in 
adequate effort to better their own situations.  However, this seems to run contrary to the finding 
that increased knowledge about the neurobiological causes of mental illness may actually 
increase beliefs about dangerousness (Parcesepe & Cabassa, 2013; Pescosolido et al., 2010).  
This discrepancy suggests the need to further analyze the nature of knowledge the public holds 
about mental illness and how they consolidate all the obtained knowledge about mental illness.  
Consequently, it will also shed light on how the general public draws inferences about 
treatability and actions of persons with mental illness.  
 Corrigan and his colleagues (2003) adopted another motivational model and proposed 
that one's tendency to hold stigmatizing beliefs towards persons with mental illness can be 
explained by system-justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  They contend that, as Western society 
discriminated against persons with mental illness in the past, people continued to hold and pass 
on stigmatizing beliefs and attitudes in order to maintain status quo.  Additionally, the authors 
highlighted the media and entertainment system as an important source from where these beliefs 
are perpetuated (Corrigan et al., 2003).  This model helps explain how and why negative 
attitudes towards mental illness came about and is a useful model to explain the current status 




 Terror management theory, and its basis on mortality salience, has been another 
motivational approach that has been discussed by several authors to explain the occurrence of 
stigma (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991; Stier & Hinshaw, 2007).  From this 
perspective, when persons with mental illness are negatively portrayed in the media, they are 
consequently construed as threatening the societal order and one's own well-being.  Therefore, 
endorsing stigmatizing attitudes towards the outgroup (i.e., persons with mental illness) serves to 
protect the self (Stier & Hinshaw, 2007).  While terror management theory does have its intuitive 
appeal, especially with sensational news of purported mental illness and violence (e.g., 
Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996; Corrigan et al., 2013; McGinty et al., 2013), the tenets of the 
theory stand on the very specific and narrow assumption of death saliency.  The stigma of mental 
illness does not stand solely on the idea of dangerousness related to death and research has also 
highlighted other areas such as presumed difficulty in communicating with a person with mental 
illness, odd behaviors, and having limited access to desired social roles such as finding a 
romantic partner or a job (Schulze & Angermeyer, 2003).  Therefore, terror management theory 
does not comprehensively explain the full experience of stigma towards persons with mental 
illness.  
 From a cognitive approach, the classic mechanism was the idea of categorization first 
proposed by Allport (1954).  Categorization occurs when people label others based on perceived 
salient attributes which range from skin color, facial features, and gender to a person waving a 
knife around; or a label of a group (e.g., patients, skinheads, and Asians).  The tendency and ease 
with which people use categorization in social interactions have been noted by many researchers 
(e.g. Devine, 1989; Tajfel, 1969) and has been implicated in interpretations of ambiguous 




Bodenhausen, 1988).  In the widely-cited paper on how labels affect perceptions, Rosenhan 
(1973) underscored the significant consequences of labels and subsequent interpretations of a 
person by describing how normative behaviors were considered pathological after he and his 
colleagues were admitted into a psychiatric hospital with the label of schizophrenia.  In relation 
to media portrayals of mental illness, categorization works in the same way, that is, the label of a 
mental illness comes along with its package of expected and at times, largely homogenous set of 
characteristics that people assume. 
 The influential line of heuristics work in the cognitive field by Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman (1973, 1974) has also been used to explain the impact media has in perpetuating 
mental illness stereotypes (Corrigan & Cooper, 2005).  Highlighting several biases that people 
tend to use in social judgments (e.g., tendency to ignore base rates and mathematical principles 
of probability), Kahneman and Tversky (1996) argued that people are generally not logically 
accurate in these types of judgments.  Well-known heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that have been 
studied include the availability heuristic and the conjunction error (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).  The availability heuristic refers to the tendency of people to make 
judgments about frequency of a phenomenon based on how easily they can remember related 
events.  Corrigan and Copper (2005) applied the availability heuristic in their contention that 
media coverage of sensational events involving both violent incidents and persons with mental 
illness increased the ease of these incidents in the general public’s mind.  As a result, they 
believed that the public is then likely to associate dangerousness with mental illness. 
More contemporary theories in social cognition have also been used to explain mental 
illness stigma.  Corrigan (2000) applied social attribution theory (Weiner, 1980) to explain how 




general public, one’s affective response, and the resulting behaviors.  Specifically, he outlined a 
model with two distinct pathways: upon perceiving a person with mental illness, one can believe 
that the symptoms are uncontrollable (controllable) suggesting that the person is not responsible 
(responsible) for his/her situation which invokes pity (anger) and effects helping (punishing) 
behaviors.   
 The above theories have largely been proposed to explain the relationship between media 
depictions of mental illness and the general public's stereotypical beliefs which, more often than 
not,  then lead to stigmatizing behaviors and attitudes.  While the theories are informative about 
how the general public is influenced by media portrayals of mental illness and why these beliefs 
perpetuate, there is still insufficient research examining the mechanism in which people integrate 
and remember information that is presented to them in the media.  The cognitive perspective has 
discussed some aspects of this issue by highlighting the various cognitive frames and tendencies 
of the human mind in interpreting information.  However, more data is needed to better 
understand how people actually process information that the media presents to them and if there 
are any moderating factors that affect this process.  For example, meritocratic worldviews (i.e. 
the role of personal responsibility and ability to control one’s life and events) have been found to 
be associated with more stigmatizing attitudes reported towards persons with mental illness 
(Rusch, Todd, Bodenhausen, & Corrigan, 2010).  Racial differences have also been noted where 
African Americans appear to attribute less blame to persons with mental illness but higher 
perceptions of dangerousness, compared to Whites, after controlling for sociodemographic 
differences (Anglin, Link, & Phelan, 2006).  
Another factor that has been found to impact on the degree of stigmatizing attitudes is 




increased contact with lesser stigma due to methodological differences (i.e. type and nature of 
contact) (Alexander & Link, 2003; Couture & Penn, 2003).  Related research on stereotype 
activation and endorsement (e.g., role of context, need for cognition, and goals) as reviewed 
earlier would also be an important resource to consider.  Examining the type and efficacy of 
these moderating factors seem especially pertinent in light of recent survey finding that about 
half the population surveyed indicated that they greatly blamed the mental health system, slightly 




















Chapter 8: Pragmatic Inference 
Given the gap in the literature on cognitive processing of information presented by the 
media, the current review attempts to look at related areas of cognition that would be valuable to 
better illuminate this process.  When considering the format in which information is presented by 
the traditional media (i.e., television, radio, films, newspaper), a notable pattern is observed 
whereby the flow of information is unidirectional.  That is, the transmission of the contained 
information is from the media to the audience.  By default, the interpretation of the information 
is thus placed on the shoulders of the audience and consequently, subjected to factors that affect 
information processing.  A situation analogous to this is in the discourse analysis of linguistic 
interaction where findings from studies on discourse processing can be used to inform on the 
understanding process that an individual undertakes upon receiving information from the media. 
One of the main areas in the cognitive approach to the study of discourse processing is on 
the process of inference.  When reading or listening to a speaker, we generally undergo the 
process of inference where we attempt to make sense of the material being presented which then 
enables us to understand the material and form a representation of the stimuli in our mind.  (For a 
comprehensive history and technicalities of pragmatics in psycholinguistics, refer to Carston, 
2002).  This process of inference is especially interesting as the product is the individual's 
understanding of the presented information which is largely determined by his or her 
interpretation.  
 In a nutshell, pragmatic inference posits that, during an interaction, the listener does not 
merely take in words of the speaker verbatim, but applies his or her own knowledge and 
understanding of the language and context.  That is, the receiver engages in an active process of 




result in an inference that can sometimes be “something neither explicitly stated nor necessarily 
implied” (Brewer, 1977, p.673). An example used to illustrate this concept by Brewer and his 
colleagues was the following: “The flimsy shelf weakened under the heavy books” would 
pragmatically imply “The flimsy shelf broke under the heavy books.” This implies a constructive 
model of communication and social interaction where the listener is not a passive audience 
understanding exactly the speaker's intentions and content, but is, rather, actively engaged in a 
constant process of interpretation. In the process, the listener may sometimes obtain something 
that means qualitatively different from the original message (Brewer, 1977; Johnson, Bransford, 
& Solomon, 1973). This phenomenon of discourse interpretation is useful in bridging attitudinal 
survey research in the media and mental illness literature with experimental approaches to 
stereotypes especially given the one-sided format of media dissemination.  
 An important difference between logical and pragmatic inference was highlighted by 
Brewer (1977) where he discussed the differences between the two concepts. Of the former, he 
emphasized the semantic relationship between a sentence (e.g., “John is taller than Jim”) and its 
logical derivative (e.g., “Jim is shorter than John”), whereas pragmatic inference occurs when the 
listener inferred an implication (e.g., “The karate champion broke the cinder block”) that was 
neither mentioned nor a logical implication of the original sentence (e.g. “The karate champion 
hit the cinder block”).  This distinction is particularly important when considering its application 
in understanding media portrayals of persons with mental illness and how it affects people's 
general perception of mental illness.  Even if the media article does not explicitly state a 
relationship between mental health status and the negative act, the audience is susceptible to 




illness.  Consequently, they may end up remembering that as the gist of information presented, 
consistent with the concept of pragmatic inference. 
 The study of pragmatic inference arose largely in the field of psycholinguistics where the 
probabilistic nature of information transfer between speaker/writer and receiver/reader has been 
duly noted and implicated in a variety of contexts including courtroom testimony (Harris, 1978), 
advertising (Harris, 1977), commercials (Searleman & Carter, 1988), attributional bias in people 
with bipolar disorder (Winters & Neale, 1985), and avoidant personality disorder (Dreessen, 
Arntz, Hendriks, Keune, & van den Hout, 1999).  A related concept in memory research is 
Bartlett’s (1932) schematic theory of memory where he demonstrated that people construct their 
memory of events based on existing knowledge structures and beliefs of the topic they hold, and 
integrate new information into the existing schema.  One of the well-known stimulus materials 
used was the Native American folk tale, War of the Ghost.  Bartlett (1932) tested British 
participants’ recall of the presented story and found that they typically omitted material that did 
not make sense to them or changed words and events in a way that adhered to cultural norms.  
Some examples are remembering canoes as boats, seal-hunting as sailing expedition, and the 
ghosts as a clan called The Ghost or simply hallucinations.  The story also became more clichéd 
in a way that was consistent to the British cultural norm (Brewer, 2000).  Bartlett's demonstration 
of the influence of schema in memory recall is often used to illustrate the end product of a 
constructivist approach to discourse processing whereby the listener is engaged in a process of 
integrating presented information with his/her existing knowledge structures (Harris & Monaco, 
1978; Brewer, 2000).  These past studies and findings all contribute to the importance of existing 
knowledge and preconceived ideas and how they impact one’s interpretation of new information 




 When considering the presentation and propagation of information by the media, one 
noteworthy process that is important to highlight is its one-sided nature, both on the producer's 
(speaker or writer) and the receiver's (the audience) end.  The presentation of the media content 
does not typically allow the receiver to have a voice in “real-time.”  That is, the receiver does not 
get an opportunity to clarify and the producer does not get any instantaneous feedback from the 
receiver.  This point is important because, in a typical interpersonal interaction, both parties 
would have an opportunity to modify their presented information based on feedback from the 
other party (Harris & Monaco, 1978).  Additionally, as McKoon and Ratcliff (1991) argued, in 
the absence of an explicit goal which can direct one's strategies as to the type of information one 
is looking out for, people may tend to rely on existing knowledge and/or explicit information 
provided.  The general layperson has arguably vague and varied goals when they digest 
presentations by the mass media.  Therefore, it is likely that they tend to rely more on existing 
world views and/or any bits of information that they perceive as salient. 
 Therefore, the phenomenon of pragmatic inference in social communication and its 
influence on subsequent memory is a valuable mechanism to consider when we attempt to 
understand how people may be influenced by exposure to the media.  As McDermott and Chan 
(2006) argued, the study of pragmatic inference is useful as it may be “the origin of many 
everyday false memories... a bridge between world-lists studies of false memories and studies of 
discourse comprehension” (p. 1274).  Pragmatic inference is thus a helpful mechanism for 
understanding media effects of stereotype propagation and audiences' resulting endorsement.  Its 
implications are wide-ranging, especially if one considers that it is hypothesized to work on a 
tacit level.  In studies of pragmatic inference, one common finding across several studies was 




phenomenological experiences of false and real memories (Chan & McDermott, 2006).  
Following this, it indicates that when people attempt to recall past experiences as a guide to 
interpreting and making judgments about other people, the memory may be skewed according to 























Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Mental health stigma has become an increasing area of concern and has significant 
negative implications for people diagnosed with mental illness (e.g., Link et al., 1989; West et 
al., 2014).  As stigma inherently involves the activation and application of stereotypical ideas of 
the targeted group, it is thus important to consider the nature of stereotypes when one attempts to 
understand the occurrence of stigma (Biernat & Dovidio, 2003).  The extensive literature on 
stereotypes in social psychology is thus a great resource and has indeed been used to better 
understand the processes underlying mental health stigma.  Prior research that has considered a 
social psychological framework has typically concentrated on explaining the reasons why and 
how people endorse and perpetuate the existing status quo and covers concepts ranging from a 
motivational framework to basic learning and conditioning principles (e.g., Corrigan et al., 2003; 
Ottati et al., 2003).  
When considering the nature of stereotypes, it is important to consider its pervasiveness 
in everyday life and extent to which it is “controllable.”  The latter aspect is especially important 
given the increasing emphasis on interventions to decrease stigma.  The automaticity research 
reviewed above points to a pervasive and generalized activation of stereotypes across different 
contexts and target groups.  Another instructive aspect of past stereotype research is on the 
various factors that influence the extent to which stereotypes are activated, or inhibited (e.g., 
contexts, information processing style, affect).  Understanding these important variables further 
sheds light on the process of stereotype activation and endorsement and is essential to informing 
on evidence-based, effective stigma reduction strategies.  While past research in social 
psychology has largely focused on racial/ethnic, gender, and age stereotypes, the results of 




of stereotypes. That is, the mechanisms and interplay of variables appear similar.  Therefore, if 
we were to apply the results of these findings to stereotypes of mental illness, it is hypothesized 
that similar results would be found.  
Relating back to the research on racial stereotypes and dangerousness, if one were to 
extend this line of research to the field of mental health stigma, similarities in findings seem 
likely to be expected.  From the survey results on the public's conceptions and beliefs about 
persons with mental illness, there seem to be a general consensus that people with mental illness 
are more likely than the average person to engage in unpredictable and dangerous behaviors 
(Angemeyer & Dietrich, 2006; Link et al., 1999; Pescosolido et al., 2010).  If the average lay 
person subscribes to this belief, it is conceivable that mental illness will be automatically 
implicated in situations where there is no clear antecedent about a bizarre or violent behavior.  
Additionally, in cases where the idea of danger is already present or primed, it may lead to an 
unfair heightened attention towards persons with mental illness akin to the Donders et al. (2008) 
study which suggested that race could be learned as a fear stimulus. 
The apparent consistency of public conceptualizations of mental illness (i.e., generally 
negative) has led researchers to consider the different avenues in which information on mental 
illness is being disseminated to the public and how that influences public opinion and 
understanding.  One area of interest and contention has been the media's portrayal of persons 
with mental illness and its role in shaping public conceptions of mental illness (Wahl, 1992, 
2003).  Research on media depiction has largely taken two routes: descriptive content analysis 
and more experimental approaches to the impact of the explicitly negative media content.  As 
reviewed above, the general trend suggests that mental illness is typically portrayed negatively 




affect consumers of the media content in endorsing and believing these negative stereotypes.  
The one aspect that is currently missing from this research area is how a consumer receives this 
information and the mechanisms underlying the influence.  The use of media as a context to 
understand stereotype activation and application is also particularly interesting as there is often 
times no direct, explicit instruction of the inference.  That is, the media's depiction of a character 
does not typically explicitly tell the audience what the intended characteristic or attributes of the 
character is.  Rather, they present a set of behavioral pattern, within a specific context, and it is 
left to the audience to interpret the presented material. 
 The current review thus attempted to bridge the two important and rich fields of cognitive 
processes in comprehension and stereotypes with mental health stigma.  The goal was to allow 
the field to better understand the mechanism by which people come to endorse stigma towards 
persons with mental illness, based largely on stereotype activation and application, in the context 
of media depictions of mental illness.  The media holds a unique position whereby it provides 
information in a mostly one-sided manner which disallows the provider to offer further 
clarification for the receiver, should the latter experience any difficulties in understanding the 
material.  In their content analysis of Australian news article coverage over two years, Kesic, 
Ducat, and Thomas (2012) found that the media only infrequently directly described persons 
with mental illness as violent or aggressive.  Rather, the authors noted that this relationship was 
usually implied by the articles through sensationalizing the stories and adding in the existence of 
mental illness in conjunction with the aggressive behaviors.  Considering the manner in which 
information is being disseminated through the media, the ambiguous context indicates a higher 
probability of pragmatic inference on the public part which is largely dependent on the receiver's 




 Given the amount of information that one is exposed to in this era, there is also added 
utility in considering how someone negotiates information received and organize and store it.  
Studies specifically testing the effects of media portrayals (both in print and film) have 
demonstrated a significant influence on attitudes (Corrigan et al., 2013; McGinty et al., 2013; 
Penn et al., 2003).  These findings hint at a direct influence of media information but have yet 
articulated a mechanism by which the audience is processing that information.  The question 
remains as to how the general public consumes, organizes, and remembers information it 
receives from the media.  Effective recommendations and interventions can be more effectively 
designed and implemented when there is a better understanding of the mechanisms underpinning 

















Chapter 10: Overview of Studies 
Objectives 
As mentioned, the main goal of the studies is to bridge the two important and rich fields 
of cognitive processes in comprehension and stereotype activation with mental health stigma.  
By considering this stigma from this perspective, it would advance the field’s understanding of 
the mechanism underlying stigma endorsement.  The current study also aimed to take a more 
ecological look at how people navigate social information and its related processes including the 
retention and recall of presented material.   
The present studies used an experimental paradigm to investigate the process of reading 
comprehension and subsequent memory of information in an audience exposed to a news article 
on a violent incident.  The goals include: first, to investigate the mechanism underlying reading 
comprehension for a news article; second, to examine if stereotypical beliefs regarding mental 
illness impact on the content of the inference drawn via an automatic activation process; and 
lastly, to examine the potential impact of mood on information processing. 
Variables of Interest 
 To examine if lay people reading news engage in pragmatic inference, participants will 
be shown a news article on a violent incident which is ambiguous regarding the antecedent of the 
incident.  The use of an ambiguous stimulus as a contextual ground follows past studies which 
have operationalized and measured pragmatic inference by use of memory measures of vague 
target stimuli (e.g. Brewer, 1978; Harris & Monaco, 1978; Johnson et al., 1973; McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1982).  For the current studies, a real-life news article will be adapted for use as a 
stimulus in the experiments. The news article will be modified accordingly so as to be 




be conducted to examine the potential impact of priming for mental illness only, and with 
possible interaction with mood (i.e., positive versus negative) induction.  
The first study will investigate the effect of priming for the mental illness concept in the 
context of a violent news article which is ambiguous in terms of the incident’s antecedent. To 
prime for mental illness stereotype, the news article in the experimental condition will state that 
the suspect had a history of mental illness.  McKoon and Ratcliff's (1992) minimalist position 
argues that, in the absence of an explicit and specific goal, people tend to rely on a priori 
knowledge and beliefs and/or explicit information presented when they read.  The lack of a goal 
here refers to having no stated objective when one processes the information, that is, the person 
is not asked to evaluate the target individual for a role (e.g., job) or on any trait (e.g., intelligence 
or friendliness).  In the absence of a goal then, people are more likely to rely on their pre-existing 
beliefs about mental illness and its associated stereotypes (e.g., dangerousness), especially when 
there is no contrary explicit information refuting that (e.g., self-defense).  
 Subsequently, the degree of stereotypical beliefs and attitudes will be measured by asking 
participants about their general impressions of the protagonist in the article, possible antecedent 
of the incident, and tested on their memory of information from the article.  The responses will 
be used as the outcome measure of stereotype activation and application. A one week follow-up 
repeated measures of the same delayed recall and recognition memory measures will also be 
conducted.  The aim of the one week interval to measure participants' memory of the article will 
be used as an exploratory tool to approximate media propagation of mental illness stigma.  Harris 
and Monaco (1978) argued that following pragmatic inference of presented information, 
receivers typically are unable to distinguish between the actual information that was presented 




the actual presented information (Harris & Monaco, 1978; McDermott & Chan, 2006).  This one 
week delayed recall is thus an examination of how participants remember the presented 
information in an ecological manner.  
 The second study aims to investigate the potential effects of mood on information 
processing and resulting memory.  Past studies have generally found a relationship between 
positive mood (i.e., happy) and increased use of shallow heuristic-type processing (e.g., 
Bodenhausen et al., 1994a) while negative moods (i.e., sad) have been linked to more controlled 
and deeper level of processing (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002).  When considering the nature of 
mental illness stereotypes, it leans overwhelmingly towards the negative end of the spectrum 
given the typically unfavorable stereotypes associated (e.g., unpredictable, dangerous, and 
incompetent) (Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999; Pescosolido et al., 2010).  
Therefore, it is expected that news on crime involving the topic of mental health, is likely to 
evoke a negative affect.  This represents an interesting first step in examining the role of 






















Chapter 11: Study 1 Method 
Aim 
The purpose of Study 1 is to examine the potential impact of priming for mental illness in 
an ambiguous situation.  Participants were presented with a news article of a violent incident, 
taken from the New York Times, where the presence or absence of a mental illness history is 
manipulated. Subsequent memory and impressions of the perpetrator in the target news article 
were measured.  
The first hypothesis of this study hypothesize that participants in the condition where 
mental illness context is primed will be significantly more likely to report the antecedent of the 
violent incident to mental illness in the immediate recall question, relative to the control 
condition (H1).  All participants would exhibit comparable memory for unambiguous 
information mentioned in the target article, but participants primed with mental illness will 
endorse significantly more false positives for items that were pragmatically implied and that is 
plausible (i.e., consistent with mental illness stereotypes) (H2).  Participants high in need for 
closure and/or need for cognition will also remember more accurate information about the 
article, that is, that there was no clear antecedent for the incident mentioned in the article and 
engage less in pragmatic inference (H3).  Participants who reported greater stigmatizing attitudes 
towards persons with mental illness will exhibit greater pragmatic inference in the mental illness 
stereotype prime condition (H4).  Lastly, participants will exhibit a greater extent of pragmatic 
inference and mental illness stereotype activation after a week, as measured from the recall and 







Design and manipulation.  Study 1 was a between-subjects experimental design 
involving two conditions: presence (experimental group) and absence (control group) of the 
mental illness stereotype prime.  The experimental vignette in the study was adapted from an 
actual news report from the New York Times.  In the experimental group, the news article 
included the following sentence “Mr. John Doe (the suspect) has a history of schizophrenia” 
while this information was absent in the control group. The news article presented to the two 
groups was otherwise identical.  The study included two discrete sessions, a week apart, in 
testing for participants’ memory of the article.  The first session contained the bulk of the 
measures (self-report cognitive style and attitudinal measures and memory for read information) 
while the follow-up session assessed the participants’ memory for the article they had read a 
week earlier. 
 While the recall measures assess the process of memory retrieval (and biases that affects 
memory at that stage), recognition measures provides an insight into the encoding process 
(Harris, 1977; Johnson et al., 1973; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). Given the study’s interest in 
examining pragmatic inference at the time of reading (i.e., encoding), the recognition measure 
provides a measure of the pragmatic inference hypothesis. 
 Procedure.  The survey was fully administered through an online survey hosting site.  
Participants were told that the survey was a general multi-faceted survey about media and 
attitudes.  After informed consent, participants were randomly assigned into the experimental or 
control group based on the embedded random assignment tool on the survey hosting site 




For the first session (Part 1), all participants were instructed to read the presented 
material (see Appendix A) carefully and that they will be asked questions after.  The ambiguity 
of the target news article was previously examined with volunteers who were naïve to the study’s 
aims and hypotheses.  Immediately after reading the target news article, participants were 
directed to the short, free response and likert-scale questions on a separate screen with no option 
to go back to previous pages.  The immediate recall memory measures in this section included 
questions on a brief summary of the article, their impression of the suspect as portrayed in the 
vignette, and what the participant thought was the cause of the incident.  Next, participants were 
directed to a filler-task where they read a vignette about the European economy (see Appendix 
B) and asked questions after.  The purpose of the filler task was to provide a short period of time 
for information retention of the targeted vignette and to mask the study’s focus on mental illness.  
Additionally, the neutral news article was of a different theme from the target violent incident 
news article and was not expected to significantly impact on the memory of the first article.  
Thereafter, participants were given a recognition test (see Appendix C) about the target 
(first) news article.  Instructions for this section were as follow: 
Remember the first article you read earlier about an incident involving the police? On 
the following page, there are 20 statements about the article. Please read each one 
carefully and indicate whether you remember the specified information from the first 
article you read. If you think the statement contains correct information from the news 
article, click on the YES button; if you think that the statement is not accurate based on 
what you read from the article, click on the NO button. Please give a yes or no answer 
for each sentence, even if you feel you have to guess. You don’t have to spend too much 




Lastly, as a manipulation check, the participants were asked to indicate if they noticed the 
mention of mental illness history on a later, separate screen.  
The final part of the survey included self-report questionnaires and demographic 
information.  Participants were asked to complete several questionnaires on attitudes towards 
mental illness, existing experience with mental illness, information processing styles that may 
impact on proneness to stereotype and pragmatic inference (i.e., need for closure and need for 
cognition), social desirability, and demographic information.  Lastly, participants were thanked 
and reminded about the follow-up part of the study a week later where they will be sent an email 
link as a follow-up.  In the second part of the study, participants were contacted for the same 
questions about the article and the recall and recognition measure described above after a week. 
Participants were fully debriefed following the second session. 
Materials 
Memory for article. For both the immediate and delayed recall portions, participants 
were asked to give a brief summary of the article, their impressions of the perpetrator, what they 
thought was the antecedent of the incident, ratings of dangerousness of the perpetrator, and 
suggested preventive measures (refer to Appendix C for the full list of questions). 
The recognition part of the memory task (see Appendix C) was based on Johnson and 
colleagues’ (1973) design of which consisted of statements that were old (used in the article), 
unrelated (including features from the original article but is inconsistent with the presented 
information), and inference (pragmatically implied by the article).  For the inference-type 
questions, there are two main themes for comparison here: general and pragmatic inference.  
General inference statements contain items that may be inferred from the provided information 




was unemployed” and “The assailant used a weapon during the attack.”  Pragmatic inference 
statements include inferences made that are impacted by stereotype priming, for example, ”The 
suspect’s mental illness caused the attack” and “The police felt that the suspect was 
unpredictable.”   
Attitudes about Mental Illness and its Treatment Scale (AMIS; Kobau et al., 2010).  
This 11-item self-report questionnaire, validated in a large US population-based study, was 
designed to assess for stigmatizing attitudes towards people with mental illness among the 
public.  Factor analyses results have indicated two subscales: Negative Stereotypes (α = .66) and 
Recovery and Outcomes (α = .69) (Kobau et al., 2010).  The measure was used as a proxy for 
determining existing stereotypical beliefs in the participants.  In particular, greater endorsement 
of the Negative Stereotypes scale is theoretically thought to positively correlate with more 
stigmatizing beliefs reflected in participants’ recall of the vignette.  Some of the items include 
negative statements such as “I believe a person with mental illness is a danger to others” and “I 
believe a person with mental illness is unpredictable,” and also positive statements such as “I 
believe a person with mental illness can eventually recover.”  Items are on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  For the current sample, Cronbach’s alpha for 
the full scale was .56 for the 11-item scale; .73 for the 7-item scale; .78 for the 3-item negative 
stereotypes subscale; and .69 for the 4-item recovery subscale. 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (M-C SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The 
11-item short form version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale is a widely used 
instrument designed to measure respondents' tendencies to respond in a culturally-sanctioned, 
politically correct manner. The items included are deemed to be highly implausible cultural 




management (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and will be used as a covariate in analysing responses, 
to probe for any possible moderating influence of social desirability. That is, less stigmatizing 
attitudes reported with higher social desirability endorsed. The original scale’s internal 
consistency, Kuder-Richardson formula 20 = .88, indicated homogeneity among its items 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  For the current sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .73 for the full scale. 
 Need for cognition (NFC; Cacciopo, Petty, & Chuan, 1984). The need for cognition 
scale is an 18-item self-reported questionnaire that taps on an individual’s preference and 
enjoyment for thinking (Cacciopo et al., 1984).  Previous research has suggested that the need for 
cognition is one individual-level variable that may impact on stereotype activation and 
endorsement such that people scoring higher on need for cognition are associated with lower 
rates of stereotype endorsement, and vice versa (Florack, Scarabis, & Bless, 2001).  It is 
hypothesized that need for cognition will moderate the relationship of pragmatic 
inference/mental illness on reported stigmatizing beliefs about mental illness.  That is, 
individuals with higher need for cognition will report less stigmatizing beliefs about persons with 
mental illness.  Items are on a likert-scale from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of you) to 5 
(extremely characteristic of you). Some of the items are as follows: “I really enjoy a task that 
involved coming up with new solutions to problems”, “The notion of thinking abstractly is 
appealing to me,” and “It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or 
why it works” (reverse scored).  The internal consistency of the scale is high; Cronbach’s alpha 
= .9 (Cacciopo et al., 1984).  
 Need for closure scale (NFCS; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  The NFCS consists of 42 
items and was designed to measure 5 different facets of a latent construct, need for closure.  The 




prone to jumping to conclusions, and dislike for ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  For 
the present study, participants who score high on need for closure are hypothesized to be more 
likely to report more stereotypical (and more stigmatizing) beliefs towards persons with mental 
illness and engage more significantly in the use of pragmatic inference.  Some examples of items 
on the measure are “I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand why an event occurred in my 
life,” “I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty,” and “I dislike unpredictable 
situations.”  Items are on a 6-point Likert scale that range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly agree).  The overall scale consistency was high in the current sample (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .92).  
 Reported and intended behaviour scale (RIBS; Evans-Lacko et al., 2011).  The RIBS 
was designed to measure one’s past, current, and future discriminatory behaviors towards 
persons with mental illness.  Specifically, it asks respondents how willing they are to live with, 
work with, live near, and maintain a relationship with a person with mental (Evans-Lacko et al., 
2011).  For the future-oriented questions, the responses scale range from agree strongly to 
disagree strongly and it includes an option for don’t know.  The overall alpha in the present study 
was high, Cronbach’s alpha = .88.   
Manipulation check.  As described earlier, all participants were asked if they 
remembered seeing the verbatim sentence (“(Name of suspect) has a history of schizophrenia”) 
after the recognition measures, and on a separate screen.  To pass the manipulation check 
question, participants have to choose the correct response (i.e., “Yes” for the experimental 
condition) on a forced-choice question.  
 Participants.  One hundred community members from an online survey recruitment site, 




participated in the study.  The college students were compensated for their time with the 
appropriate amount of credit for their class while the MTurk participants were compensated for 
USD 2 for an estimated time of about 45 minutes for the first session and another USD 1 for part 
2 of the study.  Responses from 4 community members and 15 college students were excluded 
from the final analyses due to failed responses to simple attention-check questions there were 
embedded in the online survey.  Additionally, 2 community members and 9 college student 
respondents did not complete the survey and were subsequently removed from the final analyses.  
Of note, 7 community members and 13 college students failed the manipulation check.  The final 
sample comprised of 172 participants (87 community members and 85 college students).  
Participants were randomly assigned into the experimental and control condition, resulting in 91 










































Age 28.0 (10.8) 35.2 (10.5)** 20.5 (3.72)** 26.9 (9.41) 29.0 (11.9) 
Gender (% of females) 66% 56% * 75% * 51% 49% 
Race/ethnicity      
   White/ European 
American 
46% 79% 13% 44% 49% 
   Hispanic/ Latino(a) 29% 4% 55% 28% 30% 
   Black/ African 
American 
10% 5% 16% 14% 7% 
   Asian/ Pacific 
Islander 
6% 9% 4% 6% 7% 
   Others           9% 3% 12% 8% 7% 
Education 5.99 (1.72) 6.76 (1.8)** 5.20 (1.19)** 5.84 (1.68) 6.12 (1.75) 
Mental illness 
diagnosis (self) 
13% 21% * 5%* 13% 13% 
Received mental health 
treatment 
15% 22% * 7% * 15% 14% 
Family member with 
diagnosis 
32% 35% 29% 37% 28% 
Close friend with 
diagnosis 
28% 33% 22% 23% 33% 
*p =/< .01     ** p < .001 
Note. Race/ethnicity: others include Arab/ Middle Eastern, bi/multi-racial, and other self-reported minorities; Education: 0=no 
schooling completed, 3=high school graduate, 6=associate degree, 7=BA/BS, 10=PhD. 
 
As seen from Table 1, the mean age for the overall sample was 28.0 years (SD = 10.8) 
and ranged from 18 to 68 years.  Predictably, the community sample was significantly older than 
the college sample, t(108) = 12.3, p < .001. The mean age for the community sample was 35.2 
years (SD = 10.5) while the mean age for the college sample was 20.5 years (SD = 3.72).  The 
overall sample included more females (N = 113) than males (N = 59) which was largely due to 
the majority female participants in the college sample (i.e., 75.3 %).  There were more females in 
the college sample than the community sample, χ2(1, N=172) = 6.87, p = .01.  No differences 




Close to half of all participants reported their race/ethnicity to be White (refer to Table 1).  
About 29% reported Hispanic/Latino(a), 10% Black/African American, and 6% Asian/Pacific 
Islander.  The community sample consisted of mostly White participants (79%) whereas the 
college sample included more heterogeneity (slightly more than half reported their race/ethnicity 
to be Hispanic/Latino(a), 13% White, and 16% Black/African American).  There were about 
twice as many African Americans in the experimental condition (14%) compared to the control 
condition (7%); no differences were found for the other races (see Table 1) between these two 
conditions.  
Level of education attained was variable in the community sample with 15% reporting 
high school diploma/GED, 20% attained trade school or vocational training, 10% reporting a 
bachelor’s degree, 36% reporting a master’s degree and 14% reporting attaining a professional 
degree.  The college sample consisted of current undergraduates with a comparable split of 
sophomore (36%), junior (32%), and senior/BA/MA (32%).  There were no differences in the 
level of education reported between the experimental and control condition.  
As per Table 1, 13% of all participants reported having a mental illness diagnosis and 
15% reported receiving some type of mental health treatment.  Of note, most participants who 
reported a diagnosis also indicated having received mental health treatment, r(171) = .93, p 
< .001 (see Table 5).  32% of all participants shared that they have a family member with a 
mental illness diagnosis and 28% knew a close friend with a mental illness diagnosis.  There 
were significantly more community members than college students who endorsed a diagnosis of 
mental illness, χ2(1, N=171) = 9.67, p = .002.  Similarly, out of those who reported receiving 
mental health treatment, there were more community members than college students, χ2(1, 




students for family members with a mental illness diagnosis and close friends with diagnosis.  
There were also no significant differences between the experimental and control condition in 
reported contact with mental illness (self, receiving mental health treatment, and family members 
























Chapter 12: Study 1 Results 
Immediately after reading the article, participants were asked a number of immediate recall, 
open-ended questions about the article including giving a brief summary of the article in a couple of 
sentences, impressions of the suspect, and what they thought was the cause of attack.  Two research 
assistants, who were blind to the design and hypotheses of the study, were trained in coding of the 
free recall measures. Inter-rater reliability was conducted on a random sample of 20% of the 
responses: r(34) = 1, p < .001, for summary of article and cause of incident;  r(34) = .81 , p < .001. 
The same two research assistants completed coding for all the responses in Study 1 and 2.  
Performance on the memory measures are listed below in Table 2.  The first hypothesis for part 1 of 
Study 1 was that participants in the experimental condition will be significantly more likely to 
attribute the antecedent of the violent incident to mental illness, relative to the control condition.   
Table 2. 
 
Study 1 Descriptives for Memory Measures  
 
Variables Total Experimental Control 
Free recall memory    
    Part 1:   Suspect had mental illness .25 (.43) .49 (.50) .03 (.18) 
    Part 1:   Mention of mental illness .20 (.39) .42 (.50) .00 (.00) 
    Part 1:   Mental illness as cause .21 (.41) .43 (.50) .02 (.15) 
    Part 2:   Suspect had mental illness .34 (.48) .66 (.48) .05 (.23) 
    Part 2:   Mention of mental illness .22 (.42) .45 (.50) .02 (.13) 
    Part 2:   Mental illness as cause .32 (.47) .59 (.50) .09 (.29) 
Recognition memory    
    Part 1:  Old 1.84 (.14) 1.85 (.14) 1.84 (.14) 
    Part 1:  Unrelated 1.95 (.11) 1.94 (.10) 1.95 (.12) 
    Part 1:  General inference 1.54 (.25) 1.50 (.23) 1.58 (.26) 
    Part 1:  Pragmatic inference 1.76 (.22) 1.67 (.23)** 
 
1.83 (.19)** 
    Part 2:  Old 1.80 (.16)* 1.82 (.16) 1.78 (.17) 
    Part 2:  Unrelated 1.88 (.15)** 1.88 (.17) 1.89 (.13) 
    Part 2:  General inference 1.37 (.24)** 1.37 (.25) 1.38 (.24) 
    Part 2:  Pragmatic inference 1.52 (.29)** 1.37 (.26)** 1.64 (.26)** 
*p < .05, **p < .001 
Note. Free recall memory: 0=no mention, 1=mentioned. Manipulation check: 0=failed, 1=passed. Recognition measures: the 






Study 1 Chi-square results 
 Condition   
 Experimental Control χ2 Cohen’s d 
Part 1     
Suspect had mental illness      
                         Yes 39 (49%) 3 (3%) 47.7 ** 1.25 
                         No 40 (51%) 87 (97%)   
Mention of mental illness      
                         Yes 33 (42%) 0 (0%) 46.7 ** 1.26 
                         No 46 (58%) 90 (100%)   
Mental illness as cause      
                         Yes 34 (43%) 2 (2%) 41.8 ** 1.15 
                         No 45 (57%) 88 (98%)   
Part 2     
Suspect had mental illness     
                         Yes 33 (64%) 3 (5%) 44.6 ** 1.72 
                         No 19 (36%) 55 (95%)   
Mention of mental illness     
                         Yes 22 (45%) 1 (2%) 28.4 ** 1.22 
                         No 27 (55%) 55 (98%)   
Mental illness as cause     
                         Yes 29 (59%) 5 (9%) 30.1 ** 1.27 
                         No 20 (41%) 51 (91%)   
   ** p < .001 
   Note. N(Part 1) = 169; N (Part 2) = 105 
 
 
As seen from Table 3, about 43% of the participants in the experimental condition 
reported the cause of the incident as issues relating to mental illness whereas only 2% of 
participants in the control condition reported this as the cause.  The proportion of participants 
who mentioned mental illness as a cause differed by condition, χ2(1, N=169) = 41.8, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 1.15.  Some responses include “I believe that maybe the attacker might have been 
going through schizophrenia since he did suffer from it at that moment which caused him to take 




being a mentally ill man roaming the streets unsupervised,” “I believe his schizophrenia caused 
the attack. I don't believe that the attack was provoked or intentional,” and “Delusions stemming 
from schizophrenia appear to have caused this attack.” 
In the short summary, any mention of mental health history (e.g., “mental illness”, 
“mental disabilities”, and “schizophrenia”) was coded as present.  Some examples are “Mr. Doe 
kills Mr. Brown because he has Schizophrenia;” “Mr. Brown was attacked and hurt to the point 
in which he died. Doe was then arrested and Doe lived around the area in which the crime 
happened, he also has schizophrenia;” “In the article, Mr. Doe, a schizophrenic, has beaten an 
old man, Mr. Brown, to death.”  About 42% of participants in the experimental condition 
mentioned the presence of mental illness in their brief recount compared to none (out of 96) of 
the participants in the control condition (see Table 3).  A significant difference in responses 
mentioning mental illness between the control and experimental conditions was found, χ2(1, 
N=169) = 46.7, p < .001, d = 1.26.  A moderate positive correlation is also found for mention of 
mental health history in the respondent’s brief summary and attribution of mental illness as a 
causal factor, r(168) = .44, p < .001.  This suggests that participants who recalled the mental 
health history piece of information also tended to report mental illness having a role in causing 
the violent incident.  
When asked about their impressions of the suspect, half of the participants in the 
experimental condition mentioned mental illness in their brief conceptualization while only 3 of 
90 participants in the control condition brought up mental illness (see Table 3).  A significant 
difference was found between the conditions, χ2 (1, N=169) = 47.7, p < .001, d = 1.25.  Some 
examples include “A psychotic person who might have some type of mental disorder and who is 




he is being treated;” “I think that he is psychologically ill and he further be dangerous to the 
society,” and “Mr John Doe, has suffers from schizophrenia and therefore he suffers from a 
mental disease which prohibits his ability in making correct judgements due to the decreased 
size of the frontal lobe, which could explain the randomness of his attack if he did in fact commit 
the crime.” 
Across all three recall open-ended questions, mental illness was overwhelmingly reported 
by participants in the experimental condition, suggesting that the report of mental illness was a 
salient piece of information, compared to the other information in the article, to readers and 
remembered, at least immediately after reading the article.  When asked about the vignette and to 
speculate about the cause, about 40% to 50% of participants in the experimental condition 
brought up mental illness (Table 3).  
 Besides the recall memory measures which reflect the retrieval process, recognition 
memory, tapping on the encoding process during exposure to the stimulus, was also tested. An 
independent samples t-test was conducted to examine differences on the recognition memory 
performance between the control and experimental group.  As hypothesized, all participants 
would exhibit comparable memory for unambiguous information mentioned in the target article, 
but participants in the experimental condition will endorse significantly more false positives for 
items that were pragmatically implied and that is plausible (i.e., consistent with mental illness 
stereotypes).  The unambiguous information consisted of three different types of information: 
old, verbatim items taken from the article; unrelated, items that did not appear in the original 
article and are erroneous; and general inference, items that can plausibly be inferred but are not 
theoretically influenced by mental illness prime.  As seen from Table 2, the only significant 




Cohen’s d = .78.  Mean endorsement of mental illness stereotypes item, evident of pragmatic 
inference, was 1.64 (SD = .26) for the control group and 1.37 (SD = .26) for the experimental 



























Table 4.  












Attitudes towards mental illness - Total 2.55 (.56) 2.61 (.52) 2.50 (.59) 2.58 (.60) 2.52 (.52) 
         Negative stereotypes  3.22 (.83) 3.27 (.75) 3.18 (.91) 3.28 (.90) 3.16 (.76) 
         Recovery 3.96 (.58) 3.89 (.59) 4.02 (.58) 3.95 (.56) 3.97 (.61) 
Reported and intended behavior scale 3.47 (.80) 3.46 (.80) 3.48 (.80) 3.42 (.90) 3.52 (.68) 
Need for cognition 3.40 (.71) 3.31 (.71) 3.49 (.71) 3.45 (.84) 3.36 (.56) 
Need for closure – Total  3.57 (.46) 3.58 (.39) 3.55 (.51) 3.56 (.54) 3.57 (.36) 
          Closemindedness 2.46 (.54) 2.50 (.54) 2.43 (.54) 2.57 (.56) ** 2.33 (.48) ** 
          Order 4.03 (.75) 4.02 (.64) 4.05 (.83) 3.91 (.84) * 4.18 (.63) * 
          Predictability 3.72 (.77) 3.78 (.77) 3.69 (.78) 3.83 (.86) 3.63 (.65) 
          Decisiveness 3.20 (.82) 3.17 (.76) 3.19 (.87) 3.28 (.84) 3.07 (.79) 
          Ambiguity 4.09 (.67) 4.07 (.71) 4.13 (.63) 4.03 (.73) 4.17 (.60) 
Social desirability scale 1.53 (.25) 1.51 (.27) 1.54 (.23) 1.48 (.26) ** 1.58 (.23) ** 
Manipulation check (failed) N=20 N=14 N=6 N=7 N=13 
*p < .05, **p < .01     
Note. Attitudes towards mental illness: 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree (the higher the more stigmatizing); Reported and intended behavior scale: 1=agree strongly, 
5=disagree strongly (the  higher the score, the less stigmatizing); Need for closure: 1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree (the higher the score, the greater the need); Need for 
cognition: 1=extremely uncharacteristic, 5=extremely characteristic (the higher score, the greater need for cognition); Social desirability scale: the higher the score, the more 








Study 1 Correlation matrix among proposed dependent and control variables (N = 163-171) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Part 1: Suspect had mental illness 1          
2. Part 1: Mention of mental health history .44** 1         
3. Part 1: Mental illness as cause .54** .44* 1        
4. Mental illness diagnosis (self) -.16 -.10 -.066 1       
5. Received treatment (self) -.20 -.11 -.005 .93** 1      
6. Family member with diagnosis -.21* -.11 -.040 .33** .35** 1     
7. Close friend with diagnosis -.22* -.16 -.057 .23 .22** .44** 1    
8. Part 1: Recognition – Old  -.013 .086 -.035 -.037 -.071 -.055 .043 1   
9. Part 1: Recognition – Unrelated  .037 .089 .017 -.061 -.057 .030 -.050 .050 1  
10. Part 1: Recognition – General inference -.014 -.031 -.018 .041 .037 .024 .15 .00 .14 1 
11. Part 1: Recognition – Pragmatic Inference -.16 -.27** -.15 .092 .11 .15 .19 -.14 .32** .38** 
 * p = .002; ** p < .001 









Study 1 Correlation matrix among proposed dependent and moderator variables (attitudes towards mental illness) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Part 1: Suspect had mental 
illness 
1            
2. Part 1: Mention of mental 
health history 
.44** 1           
3. Part 1: Mental illness as 
cause 
.54** .44** 1          
4. Part 1: Pragmatic inference -.16 -.27 -.15 1         
5. Part 2: Suspect had mental 
illness 
.48** .42** .48** -.37** 1        
6. Part 2: Mention of mental 
health history 
.31* .34* .34** -.18 .64** 1       
7. Part 2: Mental illness as 
cause 
.45** .30* .51** -.28 .70** .47** 1      
8.  Part 2: Pragmatic inference  -.30* -.14 -.26 .46** -.42** -.32* -.52** 1     
9. AMIS (Total) -.010 .036 -.029 -.013 .009 .13 .080 -.068 1    
10.  AMIS – negative 
stereotypes 
-.075 .058 .074 -.083 .001 .057 .058 -.058 .82** 1   
11. AMIS – recovery   -.068 .001 -.035 -.062 -.016 -.16 -.076 .056 -.80** -.31** 1  
12. RIBS .041 -.029 .13 -.030 .071 .085 -.031 .18 -.54** -.52** .35** 1 
13. Social desirability -.16 -.022 .058 -.072 -.006 .039 .099 -.074 .002 .024 .024 .009 
* p < .002; ** p < .001 









Study 1 Correlation matrix among proposed dependent and moderator variables (cognitive styles) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Part 1: Suspect had mental 
illness 
1              
2. Part 1: Mention of mental 
health history 
.44** 1             
3. Part 1: Mental illness as 
cause 
.54** .45** 1            
4. Part 1: Pragmatic inference -.16 -.27* -.14 1           
5. Part 2: Suspect had mental 
illness 
.48** .42** .48** -.38** 1          
6. Part 2: Mention of mental 
health history 
.31* .34** .40** -.16 .64** 1         
7. Part 2: Mental illness as 
cause 
.45** .30* .56** -.26 .70** .47** 1        
8.  Part 2: Pragmatic inference -.30* -.14 -.25 .46** -.42** -.32* -.52** 1       
9. Need for cognition -.021 -.15 .022 .068 -.070 .085 -.057 -.032 1      
10. NFCS – Total -.030 .031 .030 .14 -.057 .006 -.071 .064 -.18* 1     
11. NFCS – Closemindedness  -.062 -.004 -.066 .10 -.026 -.071 .019 .034 -.39** .60** 1    
12. NFCS – Order  -.045 .034 -.006 .11 -.057 .056 -.028 .060 -.063 .79** .26* 1   
13. NFCS – Predictability  .052 .046 .030 .027 .049 .011 -.076 .016 -.21 .72** .36** .45** 1  
14. NFCS – Decisiveness  -.14 -.10 .051 .12 -.043 -.028 .046 -.014 .30** .38** .013 .32** .005 1 
15. NFCS – Ambiguity  .057 .085 .018 .081 -.082 -.058 -.14 .040 -.28** .70** .46** .37** .52** -.12 
* p < .002; ** p < .001 




Self-report measures on cognitive styles, social attitudes, and response style 
Due to the large number of pairwise correlations analyzed, bonferroni correction to the p-value 
was set at .0025.  
Social desirability scale 
On the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (M-C SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960), college students appeared to endorse more items indicating higher social desirability 
(M=1.58, SD=.23) relative to community members (M=1.48, SD=.26), t(170) = -2.68, p = .008 
(see Table 4).  For the current sample, social desirability did not significantly correlate with any 
of the dependent memory measures (Table 6). 
Need for cognition scale 
As seen in Table 4, no significant difference was found between the college student 
sample (M=3.36, SD=.56) and community sample (M=3.45, SD=.84), t(162) = 1.37, p = .17.  The 
mean for the overall sample was 3.40 (SD = .71).  No significant correlations was found for 
one’s reported need for cognition and the dependent memory measures.  
Need for closure scale 
There were a total of 170 complete responses for the need for closure scale.  As 
suggested by the authors, scores above 15 on the embedded “Lie” scale should be removed from 
further analyses, bringing the final total to 141 valid responses.  The overall mean for the sample 
is 3.57 (SD = .46).  Significant differences between the two samples were found for the 
Closemindedness and Order and Structure subscales.  The community sample endorsed greater 
extent of close-mindedness (M=2.57, SD=.56) compared to the college sample (M=2.33, 
SD=.48), t(139) = 2.64, p = .009.  The close-mindedness subscale measures one’s propensity to 




a greater need for order and structure in their environments (M=4.18, SD=.63) relative to 
community members (M=3.91, SD=.84), t(139) = -2.16, p = .032.   
To examine whether need for closure moderated the effect of the experimental 
manipulation, participants in the experimental condition were classified as low (25th percentile 
and lower) and high (75th percentile and above) in overall need for closure.  Chi-square analyses 
were run for the three recall measures, and no significant differences were found between 
participants who self-reported as low and high in need for closure: mention of mental health 
history, χ2 (1, N=83) = .11, p = .57; suspect had mental illness, χ2 (1, N=84) = .009, p = .56; and 
mental illness as cause, χ2 (1, N=84) = .015, p = .55.  For the pragmatic inference recognition 
measure, no difference was found between the low (M=1.65, SD=.23) and high (M=1.75, 
SD=.21) in need for closure, t(39) = -1.37, p = .18.  For the individual subscales, there were no 
significant correlations found with any of the dependent measures (see Table 7).  
Participants high in need for closure and/or need for cognition were hypothesized to 
engage in less pragmatic inference during the recognition measures.  Bivariate correlational 
analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between the cognitive measures, attitudes 
towards mental illness, social desirability, and accuracy on the performance measures.  Table 7 
shows the correlations between the measures.  The hypothesis that need for closure would be 
significantly correlated with pragmatic inference was not supported, as was the hypothesis for 
need for cognition.  Specifically, there did not appear to be a significant relationship between 
one’s reported cognitive style and tendency to engage in pragmatic inference.  Also, none of the 






Attitudes towards Mental Illness Scale (AMIS) 
The overall mean score for the sample was 2.55 (SD=.56) and no differences were found 
between the community and college sample, t(170) = .65, p = .52 (see Table 4).  Similarly, there 
were no significant differences between the two participant groups on the two subscales 
(Negative Stereotypes and Recovery).  As seen from Table 6, scores on the total and subscales 
did not significantly correlate with any of the recall and recognition memory measures.  
Reported and Intended Behaviour Scale (RIBS) 
 
As seen from Table 4, the overall mean for the scale was 3.47 (SD=.80).  Both the 
community and college sample reported comparable scores, t(170) = -.80, p = .43, and no 
significant correlations were found with the dependent memory variables (see Table 6).  
Overall, scores on two different attitudinal measures towards mental illness did not 
significantly correlate with recognition measures.  Therefore, the hypothesis that participants 
who reported greater stigmatizing attitudes towards persons with mental illness would exhibit 
greater pragmatic inference in the mental illness stereotype prime condition was not supported.  
Part 2 
 Part 2 of the study was administered about a week later via an online messaging system 
on the same recruitment portal.  In total, 157 participants (87 community members 72 college 
students) out of the original 222 participants responded, giving a response rate of 71.6%.  Of the 
156 responses, there were 4 incomplete responses and 2 who failed the attention check.  All 6 
responses were from the college sample and were removed from subsequent analyses.  Out of the 
151 participants, 119 responses were able to be matched successfully to their responses in Part 1.  
The final sample consisted of 110 participants who passed the manipulation check in Part 1 and 




Due to the decay effects of time interval on memory accuracy, participants were 
hypothesized to exhibit greater mental illness stereotype activation and greater extent of 
pragmatic inference after a week, as measured from the recall and recognition memory measures 
respectively.  The former hypothesis will be tested by comparing the mention of mental illness in 
the open-ended recall questions asking participants what they thought was the cause between the 
two time periods.  The latter hypothesis will be examined by comparing the extent of pragmatic 
inference exhibited on the recognition measures between the two time periods.  It is 
hypothesized that memory for the old and general inference items will be worse than Part 1.  The 
scores for the unrelated items should not differ significantly as these were information that was 




Study 1 Paired Samples t-test Results between Part 1 and 2  
 
 Time   
 Part 1 Part 2 t df Cohen’s d 
Recall measures      
Suspect had mental illness .22 (.41) .34 (.48) -2.80* 101 .55 
Mention of mental illness .20 (.40) .22 (.41) -.43 100 - 
Mental illness as cause .20 (.40) .32 (.47) -3.11* 101 .62 
Recognition measures      
Old items 1.84 (.14) 1.80 (.16) 2.84* 109 .18 
Unrelated items 1.96 (.08) 1.88 (.15) 6.22** 103 .017 
General inference items 1.51 (.24) 1.37 (.24) 4.80** 103 .25 
Pragmatic inference items 1.78 (.22) 1.52 (.29) 9.85** 106 .44 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 





Table 8 shows the results of the paired samples t-test between the three recall variables of 
interest. Of the three recall memory variables, two were statistically significant. There was 
increased reporting that the suspect had mental illness after the one-week delay (M=.34, SD=.48) 
relative to the exposure stage (M=.22, SD=.41), t(101) = -2.80, p = .002, d = .55. Similarly, there 
was greater reporting of mental illness as the cause of the incident after the delay (M=.32, 
SD=.47) when compared to the exposure stage (M=.20, SD=.40), t(101) = -3.11, p = .006, d 
= .62. There was no difference found for mention of mental illness in a brief summary of the 
article. Thus, the hypothesis that participants will tend to report greater frequency of mental 
illness after a time delay was partly supported.  
Correlations between the measures as seen from Table 7 showed that all three recall 
questions remained highly correlated in Part 2 of the study.  In particular, when participants 
remembered that the suspect had mental illness, they were also more likely to report the cause of 
the incident as due to mental illness, r(105) = .70, p < .001.  Additionally, as expected, all three 
recall questions in Part 2 correlated significantly with responses in Part 1.  That is, participants 
who mentioned mental illness in their responses during the first part of the study continued to 
report mental illness in the second part.   
Results from Table 8 showed that recognition memory for all information worsened after 
a week.  Of most interest here and consistent with expectations, the extent of pragmatic inference 
was significantly greater (evidenced by the lower score) a week later (M=1.52, SD=.29) relative 
to the first presentation of the article (M=1.78, SD=.22), t(106) = 9.85, p < .001, d = .44.  
Differences in pragmatic inference measure also had the largest effect size found amongst the 
recognition measures.  Similarly, recognition of old items was worse one week later (M=1.80, 




was evidence of greater general inference made in Part 2 of the study (M=1.37, SD=.24) than 
Part 1 (M=1.51, SD=.24), t(103) = 4.80, p < .001.  Contrary to expectations though, there was 
also a significant difference in performance on the unrelated items.  Specifically, participants 
were more inaccurate in Part 2 (M=1.88, SD=.15) than Part 1 (M=1.96, SD=.08), t(103) = 6.22, p 






















Chapter 13: Study 1 Discussion 
 Study 1 sought to investigate whether the general public tends to engage in pragmatic 
inference when reading vague material and the potential effect of mentioning a trigger for mental 
illness stereotypes.  Results found significant effects for the experimental manipulation, that is, 
the mention of a mental illness history triggered stereotypical beliefs which appeared to impact 
on participants’ memory and impressions about the article.  More specifically, participants in the 
experimental condition were over ten times more likely to remember that the protagonist has a 
mental illness and the mental illness contributed to the incident than those in the control group.   
 In addition to the immediate questions which measures retrieval processes in memory, 
there was evidence of pragmatic inference in a stereotype-consistent manner as seen from the 
recognition measures.  Participants in the experimental condition (i.e., mental illness prime) were 
more likely to misremember pragmatically implied items compared to participants in the control 
group.  This was also the only significant difference found between the groups among the four 
types of recognition memory items, which further bolster the argument for pragmatic inference.   
After a week of delay, participants reported more stigma-related responses when asked 
about their impressions of the suspect and to speculate on the cause of the incident. Specifically, 
there was a greater extent of mentioning mental illness in these two delayed recall questions. 
However, participants reported a comparable extent of mental illness in the summary of the 
article one week later.  Importantly, significant correlations were found such that participants 
who had reported mental illness either as a cause or embedded in their impressions of the suspect 
continued to report similar responses after the time delay.  On the recognition measures, there 
was a general decline in accuracy across all measures.  The extent of pragmatic inference was 




that affected the encoding process of the participants.  Alternatively, it could also be due to the 
general trend of decay of memory over time.  In either case, there is evidence of a greater extent 
of misremembering in a stereotypically-biased direction.  
 Contrary to past research examining cognitive styles and stereotypes endorsement, 
correlations between need for cognition and need for closure with the memory recall and 
recognition measures were not significant, save for a weak correlation between the need for 
cognition subscale and one of the three direct recall measure (i.e., mentioning mental illness in a 
brief summary of the presented article).  This suggests that the main effect of mental illness 
prime in recall and recognition memory of information presented is not likely to be influenced by 






























Chapter 14: Study 2 Method 
Aim 
The objective of Study 2 was to extend the research on the use of pragmatic inference as 
an information processing style adopted by the lay public when reading a news article on a 
violent incident, and mood as a potential mediator of cognitive style.  As discussed earlier, the 
emotions of interest presently are positive (i.e., happy) and negative (i.e., sad).  Generally, 
positive mood is linked to less in-depth processing when compared to sad moods (Bodenhausen 
et al., 1994a; Gasper & Clore, 2002). Study 2 thus aims to examine if a similar pattern will be 
replicated in this ambiguous context and its potential interaction with stereotype activation and 
endorsement.  
Hypotheses 
Similar to Study 1, a significant main effect of mood was hypothesized where 
participants in the positive mood condition would engage in greater extent of pragmatic 
inference, as measured by their performance on the recognition memory measure (H1).  
Participants primed with mental illness would also be more likely to blame the cause of the 
incident on mental illness (H2).  More importantly, there would be an interaction effect where 
participants in the mental illness—positive condition would be most likely to attribute blame to 
the perpetrator’s mental illness, relative to the other conditions (H3). 
 Design and manipulation.  Study 2 employed a 2 (mood: positive/happy vs. 
negative/sad) x 2 (mental illness prime: present vs. absent), between-subjects factorial design. 
The design for the ambiguous context and mental illness prime followed Study 1.  In a direct 
examination of the effectiveness of mood induction procedures in an online setting, Gortiz and 




based paradigms were not effective in manipulating both positive and negative mood.  Further 
studies indicated the effectiveness and ethical use of plain texts (i.e., short stories commonly 
found online) as a mood induction procedure (Verheyen & Goritz, 2009).  The authors 
recommended the use of plain texts and noted no adverse or lasting effects in a large sample of 
participants (Verheyen & Gortiz, 2009).  As the present study employed a web-based paradigm, 
mood manipulation followed Verheyen and Gortiz’s (2009) recommendations.  For positive 
mood induction, funny text materials easily found online were used while the negative mood 
induction text was on a caregiver’s experience of taking care of a family member with 

































Age 37.4 (12.9) 37.6 (12.6) 37.2 (13.3) 36.3 (13.1) 38.9 (12.6) 
Gender (% of 
females) 
56% 54% 47% 52% 62% 
Race/ethnicity      
   White/ European 
American 
83% 86% 80% 84% 81% 
   Hispanic/  
Latino(a) 
6% 9% 2% 8% 3% 
   Black/ African 
American 
6% 2% 9% 6% 5% 
   Asian/ Pacific 
Islander 
3% 2% 5% 2% 5% 
   Others           2% - 4% - 6% 
Education 6.97 (1.97) 7.14 (2.03) 6.80 (1.91) 6.82 (1.86) 7.16 (2.12) 
Mental illness 
diagnosis (self) 
23% 26% 21% 22% 24% 
Received mental 
health treatment 
26% 31% 21% 27% 24% 
Family member 
with diagnosis 
43% 37% 48% 46% 38% 
Close friend with 
diagnosis 
48% 56% 41% 56% 38% 
*p =/< .01     ** p < .001 
Note. Race/ethnicity: others include Arab/ Middle Eastern, bi/multi-racial, and other self-reported minorities; Education: 0=no 
schooling completed, 3=high school graduate, 6=associate degree, 7=BA/BS, 10=PhD. 
 
Participants.  One hundred and nine community members from Amazon MTurk 
participated in the study.  Responses from 3 participants were excluded from the final analyses 
due to failed responses to simple attention check questions embedded in the online survey.  As 
per Study 1, the exclusion criteria were below age 18 and non-English-speaking. Participants 
were compensated with USD 2 for part 1 and USD 1 for part 2 of the study.  Descriptives for 




12.7) and ranged from 19 to 72 years.  There were about an equal number of males (N = 51) and 
females (N = 56) who were on average, educated and had at least an associate’s degree.  The 
sample was predominantly White (83%) with a small representation of other ethnicities (i.e., 5% 
Hispanic, 7% Black/ African American, and 3% Asian/ Pacific Islander).  
 Procedure.  Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1; and therefore, is also a web-based 
survey.  After informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to either the negative or 
positive mood condition where they underwent the mood manipulation procedures.  Thereafter, 
they were asked some questions about the content of the text and mood.  Participants were then 
randomly assigned to either the experimental or control vignette condition (as per Study 1) and 
asked to respond to immediate recall questions about the vignette.  A control vignette about a 
neutral topic (the European economy) was shown to all participants.  Following this filler task, 
the recognition measures were administered and subsequently, self-report cognitive styles and 
attitudinal measures were given.  Lastly, participants were asked to fill in demographic questions 
and reminded of part 2 of the study. 
 Measures. The same self-reported measures as described in Study 1 were used.  
Manipulation check.  Following Study 1, all participants were asked if they recall the 
verbatim sentence (“(Name of suspect) has a history of schizophrenia”) in a dichotomous, 





















Study 2 Descriptives for Memory Measures  
 
Variables Total Experimental Control Negative mood Positive mood 
Failed manipulation check N=18 N=7 N=6 N=3 N=2 
Reported mood 5.53 (2.38) 5.27 (2.58) 5.80 (2.12) 3.36 (2.07)** 7.15 (1.52)** 
Recall memory      
    Part 1:   Suspect had mental illness .26 (.44) .48 (.51)** .05 (.22)** .20 (.41) .31 (.47) 
    Part 1:   Mention of mental illness .20 (.40) .38 (.49)** .02 (.15)** .19 (.40) .20 (.41) 
    Part 1:   Mental illness as cause .30 (.46) .57 (.50)** .02 (.15)** .29 (.46) .31 (.47) 
    Part 2:   Suspect had mental illness .55 (.50) .84 (.37)* .21 (.42)* .56 (.51) .55 (.51) 
    Part 2:   Mention of mental illness .16 (.37) .28 (.46)** .03 (.18)** .22 (.42) .12 (.33) 
    Part 2:   Mental illness as cause .33 (.48) .50 (.51)* .14 (.36)* .37 (.49) .30 (.47) 
Recognition memory      
    Part 1:  Old 1.83 (.16) 1.83 (.17) 1.83 (.16) 1.81 (.20) 1.84 (.16) 
    Part 1:  Unrelated 1.97 (.067) 1.97 (.064) 1.95 (.12) 1.95 (.10) 1.95 (.11) 
    Part 1:  General inference 1.47 (.23) 1.47 (.24) 1.48 (.25) 1.53 (.25) 1.45 (.26) 
    Part 1:  Pragmatic inference 1.76 (.27) 1.67 (.27)* 1.81 (.23)* 1.76 (.25) 1.69 (.28) 
    Part 2:  Old 1.80 (.18) 1.81 (.18) 1.79 (.17) 1.82 (.15) 1.79 (.19) 
    Part 2:  Unrelated 1.89 (.18) 1.90 (.16) 1.87 (.20) 1.89 (.19) 1.91 (.14) 
    Part 2:  General inference 1.35 (.26) 1.36 (.27) 1.35 (.23) 1.33 (.27) 1.37 (.25) 
    Part 2:  Pragmatic inference 1.46 (.33) 1.36 (.32)* 1.56 (.32)* 1.47 (.36) 1.38 (.31) 
*p < .01     ** p < .001 
Note. Mood: 1=very sad/negative, 9=very positive/happy; Recall memory: 0=no mention, 1=mentioned. Recognition measures: the lower the score, the greater 







There were 47 and 58 participants randomly assigned to the negative mood and positive 
mood manipulation respectively.  In the negative mood manipulation condition, responses from 3 
participants were removed due to failed mood checks (2 of them had responses that were more 
than 2 standard deviations above the mean and 1 who did not respond to the questions).  For the 
positive mood manipulation, 2 participants failed the mood check.  On the two mood 
manipulation questions, the two groups differed significantly in their reported current mood, 
t(60.9) = -11.2, p < .001; with the positive mood manipulation group endorsing higher scores 
(i.e., more positive) on the mood measures (M = 7.15, SD = 1.52) relative to the negative mood 
manipulation group (M = 3.36, SD = 2.07) (see Table 10).  For the condition manipulation check, 
7 participants in the experimental condition and 6 participants in the control condition failed the 
manipulation check.  The final sample tally included 87 participants.  
Contrary to hypotheses, there was no significant interaction effect for mood and mental 
illness prime for both the recall and recognition measures: mention of mental health history in 
recall of vignette, F(1, 81) = .13,  p = .72; suspect had mental illness, F(1, 81) = .11,  p = .74; 
mental illness as cause, F(1, 81) = .074,  p = .79; pragmatic inference, F(1, 81) = .87,  p = .35.  
Only a main effect for mental illness prime manipulation was found: mention of mental health 
history, F(1, 81) = 17.7,  p < .001, η2 = .19; suspect had mental illness, F(1, 81) = 21.4,  p < .001, 
η2 = .22; mental illness as cause, F(1, 81) = 40.8, p < .001, η2 = .34; pragmatic inference, F(1, 81) 
= 7.43,  p = .008, η2 = .09.   
As seen from Table 10, there were no significant differences found between participants 
assigned to the negative or positive mood manipulation condition for mention of mental illness 




t(82) = -1.09, p = .28; and using mental illness as a causal factor for the incident, t(82) = -.20, p 
= .84.  Conversely, the mental illness prime manipulation had a significant impact on reporting 
the role of mental illness in their general impression of the article, t(48.7) = -4.51, p < .001; 
impressions of mental illness in the protagonist, t(55.4) = -5.05, p < .001; and including mental 
illness as the cause of the incident, t(48.7) = -6.77, p < .001.  
The main effect of mood was also not significant, that is, there were no differences 
between the two groups on reported recall of information which was contrary to expectations.  
Participants in the negative mood condition were just as likely (M=.29, SD=.46) to attribute the 
cause of the incident to mental illness as those in the positive mood condition (M=.31, SD=.47), 
t(82) = -.20, p = .84.  Similarly, on recognition measures of memory, no significant main effect 
of mood was found for all four sub-categories of information tested, including pragmatic 



















Study 2 Chi-square results 
 Condition   
 Experimental Control χ2 Cohen’s d 
Part 1     
Suspect had mental illness      
                         Yes 20 (48%) 2 (5%) 20.0 ** 1.12 
                         No 22 (52%) 40 (95%)   
Mention of mental illness      
                         Yes 16 (38%) 1 (2%) 17.0 ** 1.01 
                         No 26 (62%) 42 (98%)   
Mental illness as cause      
                         Yes 24 (57%) 1 (2%) 30.1 ** 1.49 
                         No 18 (43%) 41 (98%)   
Part 2     
Suspect had mental illness     
                         Yes 27 (84%) 6 (21%) 23.9 ** 1.53 
                         No 5 (16%) 22 (79%)   
Mention of mental illness     
                         Yes 9 (28%) 1 (3%) 6.76 * 0.68 
                         No 23 (72%) 28 (97%)   
Mental illness as cause     
                         Yes 16 (50%) 4 (14%) 8.57 * 0.78 
                         No 16 (50%) 24 (86%)   
  *p < .01, ** p < .001  
  Note. N (Part 1) = 84-87, N (Part 2) = 65-66 
 
As seen from Table 11, almost half the participants in the experimental condition 
attributed the cause of the incident to mental illness whereas only 2% of participants (n=1) in the 
control condition reported the link between mental illness and cause.  The proportion of 
participants who mentioned mental illness as a cause differed by condition they were assigned to, 
χ2(1, N=84) = 30.1, p < .001, d = 1.49.   
Similarly, about 38% of participants in the experimental condition mentioned the 
presence of mental illness in their brief summary of the article compared to only 2% in the 
control condition.  A significant difference in responses mentioning mental illness between the 




moderate positive correlation is also found for mention of mental health history in the 
respondent’s brief summary and attribution of mental illness as a causal factor, r(84) = .44, p 
< .001 (Table 12).  This suggests that participants who recalled the mental health history piece of 
information also tended to report mental illness having a role in causing the violent incident. 
When asked about their impressions of the suspect, 48% of the participants in the 
experimental condition mentioned mental illness in their brief conceptualization while only 5% 
of the participants in the control condition brought up mental illness.  A significant difference 
was found between the conditions, χ2 (1, N=84) = 20.0, p < .001, d = 1.12.   
An independent samples t-test was conducted to examine differences on the recognition 
memory performance between the control and experimental group.  As hypothesized, all 
participants would exhibit comparable memory for unambiguous information mentioned in the 
target article, but participants in the experimental condition will endorse significantly more false 
positives for items that were pragmatically implied and that is plausible (i.e., consistent with 
mental illness stereotypes).  The only significant difference between the groups was for the 
pragmatic inference items, t(88) = 2.60, p = .011, Cohen’s d = .55, a medium effect size where 
the mean recognition endorsement of mental illness stereotype, evident of pragmatic inference, 
was 1.74 (SD = .26) for the control group and 1.67 (SD = .27) for the experimental group (see 













Table 12.  
 












Attitudes towards mental illness - Total 2.45 (.63) 2.46 (.56) 2.44 (.69) 2.54 (.58) 2.38 (.65) 
         Negative stereotypes  3.09 (.90) 3.17 (.85) 3.01 (.94) 3.17 (.79) 3.02 (.97) 
         Recovery 4.03 (.69) 4.08 (.66) 3.98 (.73) 3.94 (.65) 4.10 (.72) 
Reported and intended behavior scale 3.51 (.88) 3.54 (.94) 3.47 (.83) 3.43 (.81) 3.56 (.93) 
Need for cognition 3.61 (.72) 3.48 (.80) 3.73 (.60) 3.47 (.73) 3.70 (.69) 
Need for closure – Total  3.43 (.50) 3.59 (.47)* 3.35 (.57)* 3.48 (.48) 3.41 (.52) 
          Closemindedness 2.59 (.64) 2.80 (.64)* 2.47 (.62)* 2.57 (.65) 2.60 (.64) 
          Order 3.70 (.78) 3.81 (.70) 3.62 (.81) 3.78 (.75) 3.65 (.79) 
          Predictability 3.63 (.89) 3.95 (.77)** 3.41 (.92)** 3.69 (.88) 3.59 (.91) 
          Decisiveness 3.13 (.89) 3.02 (.88) 3.27 (.91) 2.99 (.99) 3.23 (.81) 
          Ambiguity 3.94 (.68) 4.15 (.69)* 3.82 (.69)* 4.05 (.65) 3.87 (.70) 
Social desirability scale 1.45 (.25) 1.45 (.26) 1.45 (.24) 1.38 (.25) * 1.51 (.23) * 
*p < .05, **p < .01     
Note. Attitudes towards mental illness: 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree (the higher the more stigmatizing); Reported and intended behavior scale: 1=agree strongly, 
5=disagree strongly (the  higher the score, the less stigmatizing); Need for closure: 1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree (the higher the score, the greater the need); Need for 
cognition: 1=extremely uncharacteristic, 5=extremely characteristic (the higher score, the greater need for cognition); Social desirability scale: the higher the score, the more 








Study 2 Correlation matrix among proposed dependent and control variables (N = 84-87) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Part 1: Suspect had mental illness 1          
2. Part 1: Mention of mental health history .58* 1         
3. Part 1: Mental illness as cause .44* .26 1        
4. Mental illness diagnosis (self) -.085 -.10 .023 1       
5. Received treatment (self) -.17 -..066 -.076 .94** 1      
6. Family member with diagnosis .078 -..048 -.015 .25 .24 1     
7. Close friend with diagnosis -.15 -.059 .18 .24 .24 .33* 1    
8. Part 1: Recognition – Old  -.035 -.008 .006 .019 .027 -.32* -.049 1   
9. Part 1: Recognition – Unrelated  -.15 -.033 -.046 .11 .078 -.081 -.090 .026 1  
10. Part 1: Recognition – General inference .013 -.14 .017 .10 .13 .13 .12 .17 .12 1 
11. Part 1: Recognition – Pragmatic Inference -.25 -.22 -.16 .14 .10 .084 .26 -.22 .24 .31* 
* p < .01, ** p < .001 









Study 2 Correlation matrix among proposed dependent and moderator variables (attitudes towards mental illness) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Part 1: Suspect had mental 
illness 
1            
2. Part 1: Mention of mental 
health history 
.58** 1           
3. Part 1: Mental illness as 
cause 
.44** .26 1          
4. Part 1: Pragmatic inference -.25 -.22 -.15 1         
5. Part 2: Suspect had mental 
illness 
.15 .16 .42* -.31 1        
6. Part 2: Mention of mental 
health history 
.31  .31 .22 -.064 .23 1       
7. Part 2: Mental illness as 
cause 
.22 .16 .49** -.43** .43** .16 1      
8.  Part 2: Pragmatic inference  -..36 -.34 -.32 .43** -.22 .11 -.37 1     
9. AMIS (Total) -.027 -.017 -.044 -.19 -.019 .13 -.11 -.079 1    
10.  AMIS – negative 
stereotypes 
.14 .13 .038 -.22 -.10 .089 .021 -.25 .82** 1   
11. AMIS – recovery   .17 .15 .10 -.087 -.070 -.12 .20 -.12 -.82** -.32* 1  
12. RIBS .009 .008 .023 .18 .059 -.24 .054 -.13 -.58** -.43** .51** 1 
13. Social desirability .017 .062 .038 -.11 -.030 .086 .19 .078 .002 .024 -.062 -.20 
** p < .001 








Study 2 Correlation matrix among proposed dependent and moderator variables (cognitive styles) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Part 1: Suspect had mental 
illness 
1    
          
2. Part 1: Mention of mental 
health history 
.58** 1                    
3. Part 1: Mental illness as 
cause 
.44** .26 1                   
4. Part 1: Pragmatic inference -.25 -0.22 -0.16 1                  
5. Part 2: Suspect had mental 
illness 
0.15 0.16 .43** .31 1                 
6. Part 2: Mention of mental 
health history 
.31 .31 0.17 -.064 .23 1         
7. Part 2: Mental illness as 
cause 
0.22 .16 .49** -.43** .43** .16 1        
8.  Part 2: Pragmatic inference -.36 -.34 -.32 .43** -.22 -.11 -.37    1       
9. Need for cognition -..027 -.11 .026 .29 -.12 .071 -.006 0.18   1      
10. NFCS – Total .13 .14 -.001 -.085 -.058 .089 .047 -0.09 -.32 1     
11. NFCS – Closemindedness  .13 .27 -.019 -.061 .15 .13 .082 -.32 -.40** .61** 1    
12. NFCS – Order  -.028 -.055 .081 .016 .052 .059 .089 0.08 -.28 .75** 0.21 1   
13. NFCS – Predictability  .21 .18 .112 -.13 .11 .20 .16 -0.03 -.32 .81** .39** .57** 1  
14. NFCS – Decisiveness  -.13 -.042 -.20 -.027 -.33 -.081 -.12 -0.02 .26 .27 -0.21 0.13 -0.11 1 
15. NFCS – Ambiguity  .24 .19 .039 -.12 -.056 .058 -.028 -0.19 -.28 .79** .57** .36* .69** -0.02 
* p < .0025; ** p < .001 




Self-report measures on cognitive styles, social attitudes, and response style 
 Given the large number of pairwise correlations being examined, bonferroni correction to 
the p-value is set at .0025 for the self-report measures and main dependent variables.  
Social desirability scale 
As seen from Table 12, there were no differences found between the experimental 
(M=1.45, SD=.26) and control (M=1.45, SD=.24) group on the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (M-C SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  However, participants randomly 
assigned to the positive mood condition appeared to endorse more items indicating higher social 
desirability (M=1.51, SD=.23) relative to those in the negative mood manipulation (M=1.38, 
SD=.25), t(85) = 2.50, p = .014 (see Table 12).  For the current sample, social desirability did not 
significantly correlate with any of the dependent memory measures (Table 14) and thus, does not 
significantly impact on the dependent measures.  Overall internal consistency for the scale, 
Cronbach’s α = .75.   
Need for cognition scale  
Per Table 12, no significant difference was found between the experimental (M=3.48, 
SD=.80) and control sample (M=3.47, SD=.83), t(85) = 1.59,  p = .12.  Similarly, there was no 
significant difference in the need for cognition between the positive (M=3.70, SD=.69) and 
negative mood (M=3.47, SD=.73) condition, t(85) = 1.59,  p = .12.  The mean for the overall 
sample was 3.61 (SD = .72).  No significant correlations was found.  The consistency of the 
scale, Cronbach’s α = .94.   
Need for closure scale 
There were a total of 88 complete responses for the need for closure scale.  As suggested 




analyses, bringing the final total to 76 valid responses.  The overall mean for the sample is 3.43 
(SD = .50).  Significant differences between the experimental and control condition were found 
for the total scale, Predictability, and Ambiguity subscales.  The experimental group scored 
higher on the total scale, (M=3.59, SD=.47) as compared to the control condition (M=3.35, 
SD=.57), t(86) = -2.63, p = .01.  The experimental participants also endorsed greater extent of 
ambiguity (M=4.14, SD=.67) compared to the control group (M=3.47, SD=.62), t(86) = -2.91 , p 
= .005.  The Closemindedness subscale measures one’s propensity to consider alternative 
explanations.  On the Predictability subscale, participants in the experimental condition exhibited 
a greater need for order and structure in their environments (M=3.95, SD=.68) relative to those in 
control condition (M=3.41, SD=.92), t(84) = -3.05, p = .003.  For the recall measure, the number 
of participants who self-reported as high versus low in need for closure were too small for further 
chi-square analyses.  As seen from Table 15 too, no significant correlations between the 
subscales and memory measures were found.  
Participants high in need for closure and/or need for cognition were hypothesized to 
engage in less pragmatic inference during the recognition measures.  Bivariate correlational  
analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between the cognitive measures, attitudes 
towards mental illness, social desirability, and accuracy on the performance measures.  Table 15 
shows the correlations between the measures.  The hypothesis that need for closure would be 
significantly correlated with pragmatic inference was not supported, as was the hypothesis for 
need for cognition.  Specifically, there did not appear to be a significant relationship between 
one’s reported cognitive style and tendency to engage in pragmatic inference.  Also, none of the 





Attitudes towards Mental Illness Scale (AMIS) 
The overall mean score for the sample was 2.45 (SD=.63) and no differences were found 
between either the experimental and control group, t(85) = -.085 , p = .933, or the negative and 
positive mood group, t(85) = 1.18, p = .24 (see Table 12).  Similarly, there were no significant 
differences between the groups on the two subscales (Negative Stereotypes and Recovery).  As 
seen from Table 14, scores on the total and subscales did not significantly correlate with any of 
the recall and recognition memory measures.  The overall internal consistency for the total 7-
item scale, Cronbach’s α = .79, for the Negative Stereotypes subscale, Cronbach’s α = .81, and 
the Recovery subscale, Cronbach’s α = .80. 
Reported and Intended Behaviour Scale (RIBS) 
 
As per Table 12, the overall mean for the scale was 3.51 (SD=.88).  Both the 
experimental and control condition reported comparable scores, t(85) = -.36, p = .72, and the 
same pattern was found between negative and positive mood condition, t(85) = -.66, p = .51.  No 
significant correlations was found between the dependent measures and RIBS total and 
subscales.  Internal consistency for the scale was, Cronbach’s α = .87.  
Overall, scores on two different attitudinal measures towards mental illness did not 
significantly correlate with recognition measures.  Therefore, the hypothesis that participants 
who reported greater stigmatizing attitudes towards persons with mental illness will exhibit 









A total of 83 responses were recorded and 79 respondents were able to be matched with 
their responses from Part 1.  Of the 79 matched respondents, 66 participants who passed the 
mental illness manipulation check also fully completed the questionnaires and were included in 




Paired samples t-test results between Part 1 and 2 of Study 2 
 
 Time   
 Part 1 Part 2 t df Cohen’s d 
Recall measures      
Suspect had mental illness .29 (.46) .53 (.50) -2.92* 57 .77 
Mention of mental illness .22 (.42) .17 (.38) 1.62 59 - 
Mental illness as cause .33 (.47) .31 (.47) -.24 57 - 
Recognition      
Old items 1.83 (.16) 1.79 (.18) 2.03 65 - 
Unrelated items 1.97 (..07) 1.89 (.17) 3.44* 61 .09 
General inference items 1.48 (.23) 1.36 (.26) 3.29* 60 .12 
Pragmatic inference items 1.77 (.27) 1.46 (.33) 7.54** 62 .23 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
Note: Recall measures: Mental illness not reported = 0, Mental illness reported = 1 
 
As seen in Table 16, the only significant difference in recall measures between Part 1 
(M=.29, SD=.46) and Part 2 (M=.53, SD=.50) was for the impression of suspect, t(57) = -2.92, p 
= .005, d = .77.  Specifically, after a one-week delay, more participants reported that the suspect 
had mental illness.  No differences were found for reporting mental illness as cause and mention 
of mental illness in vignette.   
Overall, recognition memory appeared to worsen after a week, other than the old items 




inference was significantly greater (evidenced by the lower score) a week later (M=1.46, 
SD=.33) relative to the first presentation of the article (M=1.77, SD=.27), t(62) = 7.54, p < .001, 
d = .23, a small effect size.  Similarly, there was evidence of greater general inference made in 
Part 2 of the study (M=1.36, SD=.26) than Part 1 (M=1.48, SD=.24), t(60) = 3.29, p = .001, d 
= .12.  Contrary to expectations though, there was also a significant difference in performance on 
the unrelated items.  Specifically, participants were more inaccurate in Part 2 (M=1.89, SD=.17) 
than Part 1 (M=1.97, SD=.07), t(61) = 3.44, p < .05, d = .09.  Of note, the effect sizes for the 






























Chapter 16: Study 2 Discussion 
 Similar to Study 1, a main effect of mental illness prime was found whereby participants 
in the experimental condition exhibited a greater extent of pragmatic inference on the recognition 
memory measures.  That is, participants were more likely to misremember pragmatically implied 
information that was consistent with negative stereotypes of mental illness.  Additionally, in the 
immediate recall measures, participants in the experimental condition were more likely to report 
that the suspect has a mental illness and that mental illness had a role in causing the violent 
incident.   
In the delayed recall measures, the only significant difference after the time delay was for 
impression of suspect where participants were more likely to report that the suspect had a mental 
illness.  Relative to Study 1, no significant difference was found in the recall question asking 
about the cause of the incident.  The pattern of results for the recognition measures after the one-
week delay were similar to Study 1.  A significant difference was found for the pragmatic 
inference measure which indicates that a greater degree of pragmatic inference was greater after 
the one-week delay.  There were also differences found between the other recognition measures; 
however, the effect sizes for these measures were negligible relative to pragmatic inference.  
 The main interaction between mood and mental illness stereotype prime was not 
supported, and neither was the main effect of mood.  Mood manipulation did not appear to 
significantly affect participants’ memory of the target article.  Overall, self-report measures of 
attitudes towards mental illness and information processing styles did not significantly correlate 






Chapter 17: General Discussion and Future Directions 
Given the wide range and amount of information that is typically presented in a news 
article, it is unclear how the casual reader of news actually processes the material.  Past studies 
have suggested a negatively biased representation of persons with mental illness in the media 
(Corrigan et al., 2005; Diefenbach, 1997; Granello & Pauley, 2000; Wahl, 1992, 2003; Wahl et 
al., 2002) and researchers have strongly suggested that this representation has led to more 
stigmatizing attitudes towards mental illness in the general public (Corrigan et al., 2013; 
McGinty et al., 2013).  Thus, Study 1 examined if the lay public are more inclined to adopt 
stereotypical beliefs about mental illness (i.e., persons with mental illness are unpredictable and 
dangerous) when they are primed with the concept of mental illness while reading an article on a 
violent incident.  Results supported the main effect of mental illness prime where participants 
who were provided with a single line, the suspect had a history of schizophrenia, were 
significantly more likely to report mental illness had a role in causing the violent incident.  This 
was in contrast to participants in the control condition who mentioned a myriad of causes 
including unemployment, drug use, robbery, and unknown causes.  Of note, participants in the 
experimental group of both studies were 10-15 times more likely to report mental illness as the 
cause of the crime.  
Additionally, when participants were tested on recognition measures for their memory of 
the article, the experimental group exhibited a greater tendency to engage in pragmatic inference 
that was heavily biased by negative stereotypes of mental illness.  That is, they were more likely 
to misremember that the article had contained stereotypical information of mental illness, such as 
the news stating that it was the suspect’s mental illness that caused the violence and that the 




misremembered by participants in the experimental condition due to the mental illness history 
prime and pragmatic inference.  After a week’s delay, participants who reported mental illness at 
the initial encoding stage continued to mention mental illness when asked about the cause of the 
incident and/or impressions of the perpetrator.  Participants’ recognition memory also worsened 
across board, and there was evidence of greater extent of misremembering stereotypically-biased 
information.  
Study 2 aimed to replicate Study 1 with the mental illness prime manipulation and also, 
extend the study by examining the potential effects of negative and positive mood manipulation 
on participants’ memory of presented information.  As in Study 1, results from the experiment 
supported the main effect of mental illness stereotype prime; participants in the mental illness 
prime condition were significantly more likely to state the cause of the violent incident as the 
suspect’s history of schizophrenia and misremember mental illness stereotype-consistent 
information as being reported in the news article they had read.  However, there was no 
interaction effect of mood and mental illness prime found which suggests that mood did not have 
a significant impact on the information-processing mechanisms in this context.  
Findings from the two studies strongly support the significance, and practical importance, 
of the mental illness prime in an article on a violent incident, and that this prime subsequently 
affected readers’ memory of the article.  In past studies on the impact of mental illness media, 
the significance of mentioning mental illness has been documented and lasting effects in the lay 
person alluded to (Corrigan et al., 2013; McGinty et al., 2013; Wahl et al., 2002).  The current 
line of study was designed to unravel the mechanism, especially in terms of which bits of 
information stood out to readers and how they remember the information.  The results presented 




information presented in the news.  Also, that existing stereotypes impact the process of 
pragmatic inference by highlighting the parts of information being remembered.  
Another corollary implication of the large effects of the mental illness prime found is on 
the use of pragmatic inference as a mechanism in explaining everyday phenomenon.  The current 
research extends the use of pragmatic inference beyond other facets discussed earlier in reading 
and social communication (Brewer, 1977), courtroom testimony (Harris & Monaco, 1978), and 
everyday false memories (McDermott & Chan, 2006).  This also suggests its applicability in 
other areas of research such as racial and gender stereotypes as portrayed in the media.   
The pattern of findings here also appears markedly similar to classic stereotype studies 
where the researchers primed participants with a category or concept (e.g., African American 
male face) and found the presence of pervasive stereotypical beliefs of the category (e.g., hostile) 
(Bargh et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis et al., 2000).  Therefore, it can be inferred that known 
stereotypical beliefs of mental illness were activated when participants were primed and 
subsequently influenced the type of information they remembered from reading the article.  
Furthermore, self-report questionnaires that specifically assessed for these stereotypical beliefs 
did not correlate with respondents’ memory for the stimulus which strongly suggests that these 
stereotypical beliefs are activated in spite of one’s awareness.  This adds support to the argument 
for the automaticity of stereotypes, its pervasiveness, and how it can be influential without one’s 
conscious effort as put forward by several researchers (e.g., Bargh, 1994, 1999; Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Uleman et al., 2008). 
Thus, the lay person who may not report negative attitudes nonetheless is likely exposed 
to existing negative stereotypes of mental illness and is thus susceptible to their influence.  This 




information should undergo a thoughtful process that does not exacerbate the stigma of persons 
with mental illness.  Past content analyses of the media have already highlighted the widespread 
use of negative information being reported alongside mental illness (Corrigan et al., 2005; 
Diefenbach, 1997; Granello & Pauley, 2000; Klin & Lemish, 2008; Wahl, 1992; Wahl et al., 
2002).  The current paradigm used further drives home the point that any small piece of 
information that can be as innocuous as “Mr. John Doe has a history of schizophrenia” could 
spark off stereotypical beliefs and biased one’s memory of information resulting in recounting of 
stories that are at times, just plain wrong and stigmatizing (for example, as one respondent wrote, 
“the schizophrenic guy had an episode of some sort”). 
In terms of stigma reduction interventions, the current pattern of results can help to 
inform their efficacy.  A recent review was conducted on the effectiveness of mass media 
interventions in reducing the stigma of mental illness.  Results were generally inconclusive and 
pointed to small effects but slightly more supportive for prejudice, encompassing reported 
attitudes and beliefs, relative to discrimination, defined as tangible behavior experienced and 
reported.  The authors highlighted some significant limitations in this area of research, such as 
the lack of standardized and sound research methods in these research, over-dependence on 
students as participants, and not fully understanding the mechanism in which mass media 
intervention is purported to have (Clement et al., 2013).  The current studies can aid in providing 
some empirical evidence for several of the questions raised.  First, no differences were found 
between students and community members in the dependent measures and thus, this adds to the 
ecological validity of using students as participants.  With regard to improving methodological 
issues, this study adds to the literature by providing another form of dependent measure, that is, 




attitudes towards mental illness.  The current research paradigm also offers a direct test of the 
proposed mechanism of how one perceives and remember information presented in the media, 
and also provides a glimpse of the potential effect of more responsible journalism in the control 
condition where there was a significant lack of stigmatizing responses and information 
remembered.  
When the self-report data from both Study 1 and 2 was collapsed into one analysis to 
increase power, the only significant result was for the negative stereotypes subscale as measured 
on the Attitudes Towards Mental Illness scale and pragmatic inference recognition measure, 
r(237) = -.13, p = .04, indicating that the greater the extent of negative stereotypes endorsed, the 
more greater the degree of pragmatic inference.  This supports the theory underlying the 
interplay of social (stereotypes) and cognitive (pragmatic inference) factors in understanding the 
overwhelmingly negative beliefs lay people have of persons with mental illness.  However, the 
effect remains rather small relative to the main effect of mental illness prime.  The other null 
findings for the rest of the self-reported attitudes towards mental illness and the outcome 
variables also suggest that this mechanism in digesting and remembering information occurs 
largely uniformly in the lay person.  Thus, this implies that increased responsibility and prudence 
in the media can lead to more effective stigma reduction in disseminating news, relative to 
psychoeducation on mental illness to the public.  Of course, that is not to say that the latter is 
ineffective and should be ignored. Rather, it highlights the one-sidedness of media portrayal of 
information and the entrenched negative stereotypes in society that unwittingly and pervasively 
affects one’s processing of presented information (Nordt, Rössler, & Lauber, 2006).  The first 
step thus is to reduce the associations of negative stereotypes and one way to initiate this process 




shaping general consensus (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996; Jorm, 2000; Thornton & Wahl, 
1996). 
Regarding potential moderating factors, no significant correlations were found between 
most of the self-report attitudinal measures towards mental illness and information processing 
styles.  The null findings in this area was surprising, given the literature that has covered 
potential moderating factors on stereotype activation and application.  Future research would 
benefit from examining the other potential factors such as goals (Moskowitz et al., 1999) and 
context of the responses (Wittenbrink et al., 2001).  
Clinical implications 
Mental health professionals have been found to also endorse stigmatizing attitudes and 
beliefs towards persons with mental illnesses (Caldwell & Jorm, 2001; Rao et al., 2009) and even 
reported comparable low desired level of interaction as the public (Nordt et al., 2006).  While 
this study did not seek to recruit these professionals, it is suggestive of the deep-rooted 
stereotypical biases that society in general has of mental illness and which the professionals are 
not immune to as the mentioned studies have shown.  Additionally, the current results point to 
the automaticity in which these stereotypes operate in and influence memory and information, 
mental health professionals involved in clinical judgment about persons with mental illness 
would benefit from being extra mindful about the mindset and information they are using to base 
their judgment on. 
One particularly relevant finding in past memory studies was that the phenomenological 
experiences of false and real memories were not reported to be different in cases of pragmatic 
inference (Chan & McDermott, 2006).  While this was not explicitly tested in the current studies, 




implied information in the recognition measures indicate that the information was initially 
encoded by participants as such, and thus logically, the “false” memory here would not differ 
from the factually real memories experientially.  Practically, this can help explain why social 
psychological processes such as confirmation bias further reinforce stereotypes and the general 
difficulty in implementing effective stigma reduction programs (Clement et al., 2013).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 One potential explanation for the significant results of mental illness prime may be due to 
the types of questions asked and mental health-related questionnaires which may have served as 
a general prime for mental illness.  However, the same questions were asked of the control group 
and additional study check questions at the end of the survey did not indicate any particular 
suspicions from the participants.   
 The impact of overall mood on the main dependent memory measures in the study was 
not significant.  Besides the plausible reason of a small sample size, another reason that could 
explain the lack of effect is the types of mood, positive (happy) and negative (sad), that were 
examined in the present study.  It is possible that other types of negative moods such as fear and 
anger may be more relevant to the violent news article and effect a greater impact.  Past research 
has shown support in the differential effects of various negative mood states such as anger versus 
sadness in social information processing (Bodenhausen et a., 1994b), fear versus anger in beliefs 
and attitudes relating to perceived risks of threat (Lerner et al., 2003), and anger, sadness, and 
fear in attitudes towards public policies as a response to crime and accident news articles 
(Solloway, Slater, Chung, & Goodall, 2015).  As the present studies were conducted solely 
online, happy and sad moods were chosen to bolster the efficacy of the online mood induction 




Goritz, 2009) and also for potential ethical concerns about inducing anger moods virtually.  
Future research, if done in person, could explore differences between the negative mood states. 
 The overwhelming null findings for the self-report measures appear to suggest that 
individual differences did not impact on one’s processing of presented information.  One 
limitation could be the need of a larger sample to discern the smaller effects of these proposed 
attitudes and information-processing styles.  Additionally, only explicit attitudes were assessed 
in this study and the target vignette and subsequent questions may have made participants more 
aware of the target measures of the studies despite having some control measures such as the 
neutral (control) article during the retention period and interspersing attitudinal questionnaires 
with information processing style questionnaires.  Given that the influence of stereotypical 
beliefs on pragmatic inference is postulated to occur on a tacit level, implicit attitudes would 
potentially be a moderator and should be measured in future studies.  Implicit attitudes have been 
found to be present even in the absence of explicit bias (Teachman et al., 2006) and its 
importance in social attitudes emphasized (Stier & Hinshaw, 2007).  Therefore, measuring 
participants’ implicit attitudes would be illuminating in further studies to determine if individual 
difference in beliefs can potentially impact on the processing mechanism.  
Contact with mental illness was measured in the study and did not correlate with the 
dependent measures of stigmatized responses, save for one variable (close friend with diagnosis) 
which correlated only with one recall measure and was not replicated in Study 2.  The current 
results follows the general pattern of inconclusive, and at times contradictory, findings in past 
literature (Alexander & Link, 2003; Couture & Penn, 2003).  It may be that the present questions 
are not nuanced enough in terms of assessing the quality and nature of contact.  Future research 




moderating factor.  It would also be interesting to examine current mental health professionals’ 
stereotypical beliefs and extent of pragmatic inference.  Some studies have indicated that people 
working in the mental health field also hold similar stereotypical beliefs about persons with 
serious mental illness as the general public (Caldwell & Jorm, 2001), and more negative attitudes 
about recovery (Jorm, Korten, Jacomb, Christensen, & Henderson, 1999).  Thus, it is likely that 





















Appendix A: Vignette of Target News Article 
Instructions: 
Please read the following article carefully. You will be asked questions about the article 
after. 
Arrest Made in Fatal Beating of 68-Year-Old 
The police arrested a 20-year-old man Tuesday in connection with the fatal sidewalk attack of a 
68-old-man on Friday, the authorities said. The police said they were holding the suspect, John 
Doe, on charges of murder, robbery and assault. 
 
Surveillance video captured the attack, which occurred Friday evening on East Sixth Street. The 
footage shows a man cornering a smaller man, hurling him against a wall and then stomping on 
him as he lies crumpled on the ground. The assailant then walks away. Several people pass by 
the victim, H. Brown, a retired garment factory worker, but do not come to his assistance. After 
several minutes, a woman kneels next to him; the police arrive sometime later. 
 
Mr. Brown was taken to St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital Center, where he died from his injuries 
on Saturday. 
 
The Ninth Precinct detective squad, which covers the East Village, received a tip on Tuesday, 
not long after midnight, that the man they were looking for was in the neighborhood, the police 
said, adding that Mr. Doe was taken into custody soon afterward. 
 
Investigators believe that Mr. Doe had sought to rob Mr. Brown. In custody, Mr. Doe did not 
give a statement to detectives, the police said. 
 
The police have said Mr. Brown was most likely identified as a vulnerable target for a robbery, 
but have provided no other details for why he was singled out. Mr. Brown came to the United 
States 20 years ago. In his retirement he spent much of his free time at the local community 






Mr. Doe, who lives in a housing development on the Lower East Side that is also near the site of 
the attack, has been arrested numerous times, on charges that include criminal trespass; most of 
the cases against him, however, have been sealed. Mr. Doe also reportedly has a history of 
schizophrenia. (for experimental condition) 
 
Relatives of Mr. Doe could not immediately be reached for comment. The Legal Aid Society, 
which is representing Mr. Doe in a prior case, said the judge would assign him a lawyer during 
his arraignment hearing if he needed one. 
 
One of Mr. Brown’s daughters, Jenny, declined to speak to a reporter by phone. At a memorial 
on Monday, she was despondent, dropping to her knees and wailing that she had not been there 
to help her father: “So many people passed. They didn’t help, they didn’t call the police. Why 


















Appendix B: Vignette of Control News Article 
Instructions: 
Please read the following article carefully. You will be asked questions about the article 
after. 
Europe must 'boost demand' to revive economy, US warns 
The US Treasury Secretary has urged eurozone countries to "boost demand" in order to reduce 
unemployment and avoid deflation. Jack Lew was speaking at a meeting of the G20 group, 
which includes several of the world's largest economies.  
Earlier this month, the European Central Bank introduced new measures to stimulate the area's 
flagging economy. However it has stopped short of adopting the policies favored by its US 
counterpart, the Federal Reserve. As well as launching an asset purchase program, through which 
it will buy debt products from banks, the ECB cut its benchmark interest rate to 0.05%. The bank 
has been under pressure to kick-start the eurozone economy, as manufacturing output has slowed 
and inflation has fallen to just 0.3%. 
"Europe is going to need to solve its problems and resolve differences it has internally," Mr. Lew 
told reporters at the meeting in Australia, "but what's clear from the US experience is that the 
combination of taking action to boost demand in the short run and make structural changes for 
the long run is an important combination, and it shouldn't become a choice between the two. 
"You really need to pursue both." 
Mr. Lew also expressed concern about the political tensions between European countries, and the 
effect this may have on pushing through urgent policies. 
"The concern that I have is that if the efforts to boost demand are deferred for too long, there is a 
risk that the headwinds get stronger, and what I think Europe needs is more tailwinds in the 











Appendix C: Recognition Questions 
 
Remember the first article you read earlier about an incident involving the police? On the 
following page, there are 20 statements about the article. Please read each one carefully and 
indicate whether you remember the specified information from the first article you read. If you 
think the statement contains correct information from the news article, click on the YES 
button; if you think that the statement is not accurate based on what you read from the article, 
click on the NO button. Please give a yes or no answer for each sentence, even if you feel you 
have to guess. You don’t have to spend too much time on each statement, just give it your best 
guess and move on to the next statement.  
 
(i) Old items – sentences used in the article 
1. The victim was a 68-year-old male. (yes) 
3. Surveillance video captured the attack. (yes)  
            19. The victim’s daughter decline to speak with reporters. (yes) 
            11. The suspect did not give a statement to the detectives. (yes)  
            14. The victim came to the United States about 20 years ago and is currently retired. (yes) 
            15. The victim lived just around the corner and down the block from where he was 
attacked. (yes) 
            17. Relatives of the suspect could not be reached for comment. (yes) 
 
(ii) Unrelated items – including features from the original article but is inconsistent with 
presented information 
  8. The victim passed away immediately at the scene. (no) 
  6. The assailant called the ambulance. (no) 
            12. The police reported that the motivation for the attack was due to provocation by the 
victim.  
2. The suspect was a 20-year-old female. (No) 
  9. The suspect had no prior arrests. (no) 
              5. Several people rushed to help the victim when he was being beaten up by the suspect. 
(no) 
 
(iii) Inference – pragmatically or generally implied by the article  
          13. The suspect’s mental illness caused the attack. (no/pragmatic) 
4. The assailant used a weapon during the attack. (no/general) 
 16. The police felt that the suspect was unpredictable. (no/pragmatic) 
            18. The police felt that the suspect was dangerous. (no/general) 
            20. The suspect was sent by the judge to be psychiatrically evaluated. (no/pragmatic) 
              7. It took six policemen to subdue and arrest the suspect. (no/pragmatic) 
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